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Implementing the Lessons from Wrongful
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Keith A. Findley*

ABSTRACT
Learning about the flaws in the criminal justice system that have produced wrongful convictions has progressed at a dramatic pace since the first
innocent individuals were exonerated by postconviction DNA testing in 1989.
Application of that knowledge to improving the criminal justice system, however, has lagged far behind the growth in knowledge. Likewise, while considerable scholarship has been devoted to identifying the factors that produce
wrongful convictions, very little scholarly attention has been devoted to the
processes through which knowledge about causes is translated into reform.
Using eyewitness misidentification – one of the leading contributors to
wrongful convictions and the most thoroughly and scientifically studied of
those contributors – as the focus, this Article begins to fill that void by empirically analyzing a variety of approaches to eyewitness identification reform
that have been attempted. This Article establishes a taxonomy of reform efforts that includes top-down, command-and-control legislation; entirely bottom-up, essentially laissez-faire approaches to identification practices; and a
hybrid that builds on emerging notions of democratic experimentalism – a
form of “new governance” – to foster bottom-up experimentation by imposing obligations on police while giving them the freedom to develop their own
locally tailored responses to the problem of eyewitness error.
The bulk of the empirical analysis assesses the effects of the hybrid, experimentalist approaches to reform, as a contrast to command-and-control
approaches. The analysis draws on previously collected national survey data
as well as data from a few individual states, most prominently new data developed for this Article on the attempt to foster bottom-up eyewitness identification reform in Wisconsin. While more research is required before one can
draw conclusions about which approach works best, the data suggest that the
democratic experimentalist model shows promise for considerable, albeit
*

Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. J.D., Yale Law School,
1985. For helpful comments on this Article I am grateful to Rebecca Brown, Howie
Erlanger, Todd Haugh, Andrew Kim, Kate Kruse, Kim Thomas, Vic Wahl, and participants at the University of Wisconsin Law School and Indiana University Mauer
School of Law Junior Faculty Workshops, the 2015 AALS Clinical Conference
Works-in-Progress Session, and the Sixth Annual CrimFest Conference (2015) at
Cardozo Law School. For outstanding research assistance, I am indebted to Anita
Boor, Laura Davis, Clara Graber, Amelia Maxfield, Alleia Pluymers, Catie White,
and Matthew Wuest.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

1

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6

378

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

imperfect, implementation of social-science-based eyewitness identification
reforms

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................ 377
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................ 378
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 379
I. THE SOCIAL-SCIENCE-BASED “BEST PRACTICES” FOR EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION ........................................................................................ 386
A. Only One Suspect Per Procedure ........................................................ 388
B. Proper Selection of “Fillers” .............................................................. 389
C. Unbiased Witness Instructions ............................................................ 390
D. Double-Blind Administration .............................................................. 391
E. Prompt Recording of Confidence Statements ...................................... 393
F. Only One Procedure Per Suspect ........................................................ 393
G. Sequential Presentation ...................................................................... 394
H. Limit the Use of Showups .................................................................... 398
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION POLICY REFORM... 400
III. THE JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE ......................................................................... 403
A. Federal Constitutional Doctrine ......................................................... 403
B. State Court Interventions..................................................................... 406
IV. BEYOND THE COURTS: LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRATEGIES
FOR IMPLEMENTING REFORM .................................................................... 411
A. Top-Down Prescriptive Legislation .................................................... 411
1. The Mandates ............................................................................... 411
2. Assessing the Top-Down Approach ............................................. 416
B. Ad Hoc Bottom-Up Reform ................................................................. 420
C. “Experimentalist” Bottom-up Approaches ......................................... 423
1. The Statutes .................................................................................. 423
2. Assessing the Experimentalist Model ........................................... 426
V. PRELIMINARY DATA ON THE REFORM EFFORTS .......................................... 432
A. National Comparisons ......................................................................... 432
B. Democratic Experimentalism: The Wisconsin Data ............................ 434
1. Policy Dates .................................................................................. 435
2. Policy Adoption Rates .................................................................. 436
3. Policy Source ................................................................................ 437
4. Double-Blind & Sequential Procedures ........................................ 438
5. Constructing & Conducting the Lineup or Array ......................... 442
6. Policies on Showups ..................................................................... 445
C. The Virginia Comparison .................................................................... 448
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 451

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/6

2

Findley: Implementing the Lessons

2016]

IMPLEMENTING THE LESSONS

379

INTRODUCTION
DNA proved that Cody Davis was innocent of the West Palm Beach,
Florida, robbery that landed him in prison.1 What was remarkable about his
case was not so much that DNA evidence proved his innocence – more than
300 individuals have been exonerated by DNA in recent years.2 Nor was it
that that he served many years in prison before exoneration – he did not; unlike most wrongly convicted individuals who spend years or decades in prison, the DNA exonerated Davis after just five months in prison. Nor was it
unusual that the primary evidence used to convict him had been eyewitness
identification testimony – eyewitness testimony is the most common evidentiary feature of wrongful convictions among those later exonerated by DNA.3
Rather, what was perhaps most noteworthy – aside from the fact that the
DNA in his case was not tested before conviction – was that the eyewitness
evidence was obtained in 2006 using traditional photo lineup methods, years
after considerable social science research had shown that the procedures police used in his case were likely to create significant risks of misidentification. Despite abundant scientific research on better ways to conduct identification procedures and extensive research demonstrating the prevalence of
eyewitness error in wrongful conviction cases, police were still using old,
unreliable identification procedures.
Unfortunately, Davis’s case is hardly alone; it is, to the contrary, representative of an alarming disconnect that has emerged between a growing
body of knowledge about wrongful convictions and the steps that can be taken to reduce them, on the one hand, and efforts in the criminal justice system
to implement those measures, on the other.
This Article marks a new turn in wrongful conviction scholarship by
undertaking an analysis of the processes for translating learning into action to
prevent wrongful convictions, particularly those based on eyewitness error. It
is a first-of-its-kind empirical analysis of the efficacy of reform efforts that lie
on a spectrum from top-down legislative directives to bottom-up approaches
that rely, to various degrees, on local experimentation to reform police eyewitness identification practices.
Learning about the flaws in the criminal justice system that have produced wrongful convictions has progressed at a dramatic pace since 1989,
when postconviction DNA testing exonerated the first innocent individuals.4

1. Cody Davis, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/casesfalse-imprisonment/cody-davis (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
2. Exonerating the Innocent, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/free-innocent/exonerating-the-innocent (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
3. Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence
project.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/eyewitness-misidentification (last visited Feb.
21, 2016).
4. In 1989, Gary Dotson in Illinois and David Vasquez in Virginia became the
first convicted individuals “to be exonerated by post-conviction DNA testing.” Keith
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Research has focused primarily on specific recurring causes of wrongful convictions, including eyewitness identification errors,5 false confessions,6
flawed forensic sciences,7 false jailhouse informant testimony,8 prosecutorial
and police misconduct,9 and a host of cognitive biases that can combine with
these factors to lead the system to focus on the wrong person (i.e., tunnel
vision).10 While the research has largely addressed these specific error
points, it has also approached the problem from a systems perspective, viewing error not just as, or even primarily, the result of individual and isolated
human errors, but as the product of systemic and institutional arrangements
that permit or create conditions for error.11 And while much remains to be
learned even on these heavily studied matters, in many of these areas, the
expansion of our knowledge has been nothing short of remarkable.
Application of that knowledge to improving the criminal justice system,
however, has lagged far behind the growth in knowledge. For example, despite considerable research about the interrogation techniques that can induce
A. Findley, Innocence Found: The New Revolution in American Criminal Justice, in
CONTROVERSIES IN INNOCENCE CASES IN AMERICA 3, 4 (Lucy Cooper ed., 2014).
5. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 615, 615–16 (2006) [hereinafter Wells, Systemic Reforms].
6. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 901–07 (2003).
7. See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN
THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter A PATH FORWARD],
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf.
8. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND
THE EROSION OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2011).
9. See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE
ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–2009
(2010), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/ncippubs/2.
10. See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel
Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291 (2006).
11. James M. Doyle, NIJ’s Sentinel Events Initiative: Looking Back to Look
Forward, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Nov. 2013), http://nij.gov/journals/273/Pages/sentinelevents.aspx; James M. Doyle, The Paradigm Shift in Criminal Justice, CRIME REP.
(Mar. 4, 2014, 10:55 AM), http://www.thecrimereport.org/viewpoints/2014-03-theparadigm-shift-in-criminal-justice. See James M. Doyle, How the ‘New Normal’
Convicts the Innocent, CRIME REP. (Feb. 4, 2015, 7:53 AM), http://www.thecrime
report.org/news/articles/2015-02-how-the-new-normal-convicts-the-innocent; Anthony W. Batts et al., Perspectives in Policing: Policing and Wrongful Convictions,
NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV. 15 (Aug. 2014), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/246328.pdf (“Implementing an organizational accident model allows
police departments to review errors as systemwide weaknesses instead of single-cause
mistakes.”); Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77
ALB. L. REV. 955, 955–56 (2014) (innocence “scholarship shows that errors of justice
are not inevitable results of human fallibility but are produced by systems that are
correctible”). For an example of a systems approach to studying police error in one
case, see JOHN SHANE, LEARNING FROM ERROR IN POLICING: A CASE STUDY IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENT THEORY (2013).
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false confessions, little has been done in the United States12 to change the
way police interrogate suspects, or the way courts approach admissibility of
confession evidence.13 Moreover, although it is widely recognized that electronic recording of custodial interrogations is the single most important safeguard against false confessions, and that electronic recording is the future,
most jurisdictions still do not require recording.14 Similarly, none of the National Academy of Sciences’s (“NAS”) recommendations from its groundbreaking 2009 report on forensic sciences have been adopted, although the
recommendations are finally, slowly, beginning to receive serious consideration.15 Likewise, virtually nothing has been done in most jurisdictions to
guard against false jailhouse informant testimony.16 And, in what is probably
12. Somewhat more has been done to reform police interrogation tactics in other
places, notably the United Kingdom, where police use what they call the “investigative interview,” rather than the accusatory interrogation that is typical in the United
States. See, e.g., Brian L. Cutler et al., Interrogations and False Confessions: A Psychological Perspective, 18 CANADIAN CRIM. L. REV. 153, 167 (2014); Barry C. Feld,
Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids, 23 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 415 (2013).
13. Sara C. Appleby et al., Police-Induced Confessions: An Empirical Analysis
of Their Content and Impact, 19 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 111, 113 (2013); Brian L.
Cutler, Keith A. Findley & Danielle Loney, Expert Testimony on Interrogation and
False Confession, 82 UMKC L. REV. 589, 597 (2014); Deborah Davis & Richard A.
Leo, To Walk in Their Shoes: The Problem of Missing, Misunderstood, and Misrepresented Context in Judging Criminal Confessions, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 737, 751
(2012); Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010); Richard A. Leo & Kimberly D.
Richman, Mandate the Electronic Recording of Police Interrogations, 6
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 791, 791 (2007); Jennifer T. Perillo & Saul M. Kassin,
Inside Interrogation: The Lie, the Bluff, and False Confessions, 35 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 327 (2011).
14. See Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations:
Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1136 (2005).
15. A central recommendation of the NAS was that the federal government
should create a National Institute for Forensic Sciences (“NIFS”). A PATH FORWARD,
supra note 7. While Congress has balked at creating a new, independent federal
agency, the Department of Justice and the National Institute of Standards and Technology have collaborated to create a National Commission on Forensic Sciences. See
Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Scis., General Information, National Commission on
Forensic Science, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ncfs (last visited Feb. 22,
2016). That Commission is beginning to address many of the recommendations in the
NAS Report. See Nat’l Comm’n on Forensic Scis., Work Products, DEP’T JUST.,
http://www.justice.gov/ncfs/work-products (last visited Feb. 22, 2016).
16. The exceptions are few and limited. Most notable is Los Angeles, which was
rocked in 1989 after notorious jailhouse snitch Leslie Vernon White demonstrated on
national television how easy it was for snitches to obtain and present convincing false
evidence in return for leniency in their own cases. See, e.g., CAL. COMMISSION ON
FAIR ADMIN. JUST., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING INFORMANT
TESTIMONY 2 (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/jailhouse/
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the most rigorously and scientifically studied of all of these areas – eyewitness identifications – reform has been spotty at best, despite abundant and
solid scientific research that has largely settled on a host of “best practices”
that can minimize the risk of eyewitness error.17
This Article examines the problems with translating learning into reform, and thereby embarks on a new line of inquiry in wrongful convictions
scholarship. The Article examines efforts at implementing the lessons from
the wrongful convictions, focusing in particular on the example of eyewitness
identification reforms. The Article focuses on eyewitness misidentification,
both because misidentification is such a common feature of wrongful convictions, and because, as we shall see, the scientifically based “best practices”
for minimizing eyewitness error are so widely recognized. Eyewitness identification, therefore, can be seen as a best-case scenario for reform. By undertaking this inquiry into eyewitness identification reform efforts, this Article
joins a new wave of scholarship that moves beyond a focus “on the substantive content of policies (e.g., the ‘causes and cures’ paradigm) . . . [to] the
process by which public policy actually advances.”18
In some respects, the slow pace of reform ought not be surprising. The
legal system is notoriously resistant to change, even when the premises upon
which it rests shift.19 Slow, uneven reform is also to be expected given that
official/official%20report.pdf. Following a Grand Jury inquiry, the District Attorney’s Office adopted policy guidelines strictly controlling the use of jailhouse informants. See id. at 3 (citing REPORT OF THE 1989–90 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND
JURY: INVESTIGATION OF THE INVOLVEMENT OF JAIL HOUSE INFORMANTS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY (1990)). Thereafter, in 2006,
the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice issued a report recommending that all prosecutors in the state adopt similar policies and that the legislature enact a statutory requirement of corroboration of in-custody informant testimony.
Id. at 4–9. The legislature adopted a corroboration requirement in 2011. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1111.5 (West 2016).
17. See Rebecca Brown & Stephen Saloom, The Imperative of Eyewitness Identification Reform and the Role of Police Leadership, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 535, 537, 539
(2013). Some questions about the accuracy of various eyewitness identification practices remain, however, and at least one scholar has argued that slow reform in this
arena has helped to avoid requiring practices that may not be the most accurate. See
Steven E. Clark, Eyewitness Identification: California Reform Redux, 7 POL’Y
MATTERS 5 (2015), http://policymatters.ucr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/pmvol7-1-eyewitness-reform.pdf.
18. Zalman & Carrano, supra note 11, at 965 (emphasis added). See Marvin
Zalman & Nancy E. Marion, The Public Policy Process and Innocence Reform, in
WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE 24
(Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds., 2014).
19. See DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY
SYNDROME” AND THE INERTIA OF INJUSTICE (2014). Focusing on so-called “Shaken
Baby Syndrome” prosecutions, for example, Deborah Tuerkheimer has recently written extensively about the slow and uneven way that science-dependent prosecutions
have adapted to new understandings about the science they rely upon, leading to periods of entropy and an irrational distribution of justice. Id.; Deborah Tuerkheimer,
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the criminal justice system is notably diffuse and fragmented and, hence,
difficult to move as an entity. Others have long noted that to speak of a criminal justice “system” is itself misleading, given that the “system” is made up
of countless, largely independent, institutions and actors – including police,20
prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation and parole officers, courts, and legislatures. Moreover, the criminal justice “system” is marked by geographical
and jurisdictional dispersion; it is composed of both federal and separate state
institutional structures, along with innumerable federal, state, and local courts
and thousands of local, largely independent, police agencies. Among other
things, this diffusion means that adaptation to new knowledge can be slow
and erratic.
To be sure, progress on reform has been made – even dramatic progress
for a system not known for its agility in reshaping itself. Indeed, innocencebased understandings and policy initiatives have advanced at a significant
enough pace that they have become part of what some have labeled the “innocence revolution.”21 But, as key observers of the innocence movement
have acknowledged, the momentousness of these developments “should be
balanced by evidence that reform is limited, partial, and spotty.”22
While perhaps not surprising, the general unresponsiveness (or at least
slowness) of the criminal justice system to lessons learned from the study of
system error is nonetheless troubling. For a system that prides itself on its
commitment to truth and fairness, failure to incorporate new knowledge that
can both minimize the risks of convicting the innocent and enhance the ability to convict the guilty is deeply problematic.23 The current sluggishness
Science-Dependent Prosecution and the Problem of Epistemic Contingency: A Study
of Shaken Baby Syndrome, 62 ALA. L. REV. 513 (2011); Deborah Tuerkheimer, The
Next Innocence Project: Shaken Baby Syndrome and the Criminal Courts, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009).
20. In almost every American jurisdiction, police are independent of any
statewide or national governing structure. Accordingly, in the United States today
there are more than 18,000 autonomous law enforcement agencies, each enjoying the
prerogative to establish its own practices and procedures. See POLICE EXEC.
RESEARCH FORUM, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
PROCEDURES IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 12 (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.police
forum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Eyewitness_Identification/a%20
national%20survey%20of%20eyewitness%20identification%20procedures%20in%
20law%20enforcement%20agencies%202013.pdf.
21. Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 573, 573 (2004); Findley, supra note 4, at 3.
22. Zalman & Carrano, supra note 11, at 963.
23. Along with others, I have previously argued that many of the innocencebased reforms come at no or little concomitant loss of conviction of the guilty, but
rather, by enhancing the reliability of the system’s truth-seeking functions, can simultaneously protect the innocent and help convict the guilty. See Keith A. Findley,
Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the Innocence Movement Merges
Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 167 (2008). That view
is not free of all controversy, however. See Steven E. Clark, Costs and Benefits of
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demands inquiry into what approaches (if any) can be and have been effective
at translating the growing body of knowledge about wrongful convictions
into criminal justice system reforms.
This Article examines these questions in several dimensions. First, in
Part I, the Article provides a brief overview of the lessons learned about eyewitness error and its role in producing miscarriages of justice – both the conviction of the innocent and its mirror, the failure to convict the guilty. Most
importantly, this Part identifies the various “best practices” for conducting
identification procedures that have been recognized by the social psychological research and almost universally accepted by scholars and leading law
enforcement organizations that have studied the research.
In Part II, the Article then briefly canvasses the current state of practice
around the country. It identifies those jurisdictions where progress has been
made implementing these “best practices” and those where reform has been
slower, or virtually non-existent.
Part III continues the survey of the current landscape by assessing judicial doctrine and the role it plays in guiding eyewitness identification practice.
In Part IV, the Article considers the various approaches to reform that
have been attempted in these assorted jurisdictions, and it compares the relative effectiveness of these approaches in these jurisdictions. It identifies several different approaches attempted variously by legislatures, courts, and law
enforcement agencies themselves. First, some states employ “command and
control” or “top down” directives. Top-down approaches typically involve
legislation or judicial decisions demanding compliance with best practices
and defining for police the content of those best practices. Second, some
states have eschewed such direct control of police practices and have instead
sought incremental reform premised on police buy-in and initiative. In these
states, reform efforts have focused on training and persuasion, hoping to get
individual law enforcement agencies to adopt the best practices by choice.
Third, some states, to varying degrees, have attempted a middle path, which
can be seen to some degree as modeling emerging theories of “new governance” and, in particular, “democratic experimentalism.”24 In these jurisdictions, reform is not top down, but bottom up. But it is also not entirely laissez-faire, leaving police to reform or not at their unguided discretion. InEyewitness Identification Reform: Psychological Science and Public Policy, 7 PERSP.
ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 238 (2012) [hereinafter Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness
Identification Reform]. The Clarkian critique, in turn, is itself subject to criticism.
See Eryn J. Newman & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Clarkian Logic on Trial, 7 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. SCI. 260 (2012); Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Reforms:
Are Suggestiveness-Induced Hits and Guesses True Hits?, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI.
264 (2012).
24. See Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New
Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 648 (2006); see also Kami Chavis
Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountability: A
Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 376 (2010).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/6

8

Findley: Implementing the Lessons

2016]

IMPLEMENTING THE LESSONS

385

stead, it imposes on police at the local level a responsibility to develop policies and procedures designed to minimize eyewitness error. Under this model, in its ideal form, those efforts at provisional and localized problem solving
are then embedded within larger frameworks designed to encourage learning,
compliance, and improvement.25
The thickest analysis in this Article, in Part V, examines the data on the
reform efforts, particularly the democratic experimentalist approach. It draws
upon national data, existing data from a few specific states, and new empirical data I have collected to examine an attempt to foster bottom-up reform in
Wisconsin, based in part on principles of democratic experimentalism. Part
V describes the Wisconsin reform effort and its fit with experimentalist theory and compares the Wisconsin data I have collected with similar existing
data from a few other jurisdictions, most notably Virginia, that have attempted similar or alternative reform models. The Article concludes that the democratic experimentalist model has achieved significant but incomplete success, and it highlights additional measures that need to be pursued to improve
police responsiveness.
At the outset, it is important to note that the analysis in this Article is
limited in scope in several ways. First, while it considers alternative approaches to effecting eyewitness identification reform, it analyzes the data in
depth only with regard to one approach – the approach that loosely, but imperfectly, fits the democratic experimentalist paradigm – and in greatest depth
in one jurisdiction – Wisconsin. A fuller assessment of the effectiveness of
alternative reform models depends on additional research that thoroughly
analyzes alternative approaches undertaken in other jurisdictions and under
different circumstances. Second, this analysis examines only the response on
paper to the demand for reform by examining the written policies and procedures adopted by law enforcement agencies. While current anecdotal evidence suggests that officers in the field in Wisconsin are indeed changing the
way they conduct identification procedures in line with their written policies,
it is not safe to assume that because police have reformed their practices on
paper – the law on the books – they have fully changed them in practice – the
law on the streets. Follow-up research is required, and planned, to assess the
extent to which reform is permeating the rank-and-file work of investigators.
Finally, at the risk of stating the obvious, it should be noted explicitly
that this analysis addresses reform of only one segment of the criminal justice
system – the police – and the manner in which they conduct eyewitness identification procedures in particular. That narrow focus is not to suggest either
that the lessons from wrongful convictions point only to the need for improving police practices, or that the model analyzed here might achieve similar
levels of effectiveness or ineffectiveness with other types of problems or other segments of the system. The lessons from wrongful convictions do not just
teach about the need for better police practices, but indeed about the need for
improved practices throughout the system. Among other things, these other
25. Kruse, supra note 24, at 648.
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lessons include the need for reform in the way the system produces and uses
evidence beyond eyewitness testimony, including forensic science evidence,
confessions, informant testimony – indeed, virtually all types of evidence.
The lessons extend as well to the need for reform in the way that prosecutors
and defense attorneys are funded and do their work, the rules that govern
access to and admissibility of evidence and the proceedings at trial, and the
procedures and standards for reviewing appeals and post-conviction claims of
innocence.
But because eyewitness error is such a prominent feature of known
wrongful convictions, and because the “best practices” for reducing misidentifications are, uniquely among the “causes” of wrongful convictions, thoroughly researched and in their general contours almost universally accepted,
this problem is a good one with which to begin the discussion about how to
move from learning about error to actually changing the system to minimize
error.

I. THE SOCIAL-SCIENCE-BASED “BEST PRACTICES” FOR
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
For more than a century, psychologists have studied human perception
and memory and the ways they affect reliability of eyewitness identifications.26 While that research lay fallow for decades,27 the study of eyewitness
identifications escalated dramatically in the 1970s and has proceeded at a
rapid pace ever since.28 While the legal system, for its part, has occasionally
noted the data on the fallibility of eyewitness identification,29 until recently
courts have largely ignored the lessons from the psychological research.30
26. See JAMES M. DOYLE, TRUE WITNESS: COPS, COURTS, SCIENCE, AND THE
BATTLE AGAINST MISIDENTIFICATION xi (2005). Professor Hugo Munsterberg, the
German-born chair of Harvard’s psychology laboratory, conducted groundbreaking
psychological research on eyewitness error in the early days of the twentieth century.
Id. at 9.
27. For an engaging and informative telling of the largely unsuccessful efforts of
Professor Munsterberg to get the legal academy to take note of the psychological
science, see id. at 9–34.
28. Id. at 98.
29. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
30. See Gary L. Wells et al., Why Do Motions to Suppress Suggestive Eyewitness
Identifications Fail?, in CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 168 (Brian L. Cutler, ed., 2012) [hereinafter Wells et al.,
Why Do Motions to Suppress Suggestive Eyewitness Identifications Fail?]. Indeed, as
numerous scholars have now noted, the well-known due process test adopted by the
Supreme Court in Manson v. Brathwaite and Neil v. Biggers directs courts to assess
reliability of confession evidence based upon factors that the empirical research
shows are not correlated with accuracy. See id. at 167–84 (citing Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)); Findley, supra note 4.
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With the introduction of DNA evidence and its ability to determine guilt and
innocence with near certainty – and hence, to prove the inaccuracy of some
eyewitness identifications – the scope and magnitude of the problem of eyewitness error for the first time became unavoidably glaring. Quickly, researchers began to realize that eyewitness error was a leading contributor to
the emerging phenomenon of wrongful convictions. Study after study suggested that, in upwards of seventy-five percent of the cases in which DNA
had proved that a convicted individual was actually innocent, eyewitness
error was a contributing factor in the wrongful conviction.31 Although reform
remained slow, the legal system began to take notice.
The aftermath of this extensive research has resulted in development of
a set of practices almost universally agreed upon in its broad outline as a set
of “best practices” for minimizing the risks of contaminating eyewitness
identification evidence. A “white paper” commissioned by the American
Psychology and Law Society in 1998 was among the first official publications to note the growing consensus among researchers about a set of best
practices.32 A year later, in 1999, the National Institute of Justice (“NIJ”) of
the U.S. Department of Justice compiled the most up-to-date research and
published a similar set of findings and recommendations in an official guide
for law enforcement (the “NIJ guidelines”).33 The American Bar Association
followed a few years later with a published statement of best practices that
incorporated similar findings and recommendations.34 In the states, commission after commission created to examine the problem of eyewitness error in
31. See Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 3; BRANDON L. GARRETT,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 48 (2011);
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 122–25 (2008)
[hereinafter Garrett, Judging Innocence]; BUREAU OF TRAINING & STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY AND PROCEDURE FOR
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2005) [hereinafter WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY],
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/sites/default/files/2009-news/eyewitness-public20091105.pdf. Subsequent data collected by Sam Gross and his colleagues, which
they maintain through the National Registry of Exonerations, suggests that, when one
moves beyond the DNA exonerations to look at all exonerations, regardless of the
nature of the evidence used to exonerate, eyewitness error remains a significant, but
not quite so prevalent, contributor to the problem. Alexandra E. Gross, Witness Recantation Study: Preliminary Findings, U. MICH. L. SCH. (Samuel R. Gross ed., May
2013), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/RecantationUpdate
_5_2013.pdf.
32. See Gary L. Wells et al., Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603 (1998).
33. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A
GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT (1999) [hereinafter EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE],
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/178240.pdf.
34. American Bar Association Statement of Best Practices for Promoting the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification Procedures, A.B.A. (2004), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newsletter/
crimjust_policy_am04111c.authcheckdam.doc.
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the aftermath of wrongful convictions recognized essentially the same list of
reforms.35 Several state attorneys general issued guidelines incorporating the
research-based recommendations.36 In 2010, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police issued a model policy for eyewitness identifications embracing the reforms.37 And, most recently, the NAS issued a report whose purpose was to settle the science of eyewitness identification, similarly agreeing
upon many of these reforms.38 As the NAS concluded, “A range of best practices has been validated by scientific methods and research and represents a
starting place for efforts to improve eyewitness identification procedures.”39
While the reports and policies vary in their scope and specificity, the essence of their recommendations is generally consistent. My purpose in setting forth the basic recommendations below is not to fully discuss or analyze
all of the reforms, or to suggest that all have been equally embraced by each
of the organizations or reports referenced above (indeed, a few of the reform
recommendations have undergone some scientific revision or controversy in
recent years, and my purpose here is not to assess their individual scientific
strengths). Rather, my objective is just to outline a set of recommended “best
practices” – those that have typically been adopted by legislatures or governmental policy-makers – in order to provide a baseline for assessing the effectiveness of reform efforts at implementing those practices.

A. Only One Suspect Per Procedure
First, the research suggests that, in every case, no matter how many suspects there might be, each lineup procedure (whether live or photographic)
should contain only one suspect.40 A lineup is a test of an eyewitness’s abil35. See, e.g., N.C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE COMM’N, N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF.
SERVICES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, http://www.
ncids.org/New%20Legal%20Resources/Eyewitness%20ID.pdf (last visited Mar. 2,
2016); CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING EYE WITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (Apr. 13, 2006),
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/eyewitness/official/eyewitnessidrep.pdf.
36. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., N.J. DEP’T OF LAW & PUB. SAFETY,
ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE
LINEUP IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (Apr. 18, 2001) [hereinafter N.J. ATT’Y GEN.
GUIDELINES], http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf; WIS. DOJ MODEL
POLICY, supra note 31, at 7–12.
37. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION MODEL
POLICY (2010), http://dpa.ky.gov/NR/rdonlyres/BE390C82-E7DD-4A1E-8A3A4702C5110CD1/0/InternationalAssocofChiefsofPolice.pdf.
38. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT: ASSESSING
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (2014) [hereinafter IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT]
http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/copy_of_Identifyingthe
CulpritAssessingEyewitnessIdentificationNAS10.02.2014.pdf.
39. Id. at 104.
40. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 623; Gary L. Wells & John W.
Turtle, Eyewitness Identification: The Importance of Lineup Models, 99 PSYCHOL.
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ity to accurately use recognition memory, not guesswork, to select a suspect.41 A lineup with more than one suspect (or worse, a lineup consisting
entirely of suspects, like the now infamous Duke lacrosse team photo lineup)
means the witness is given a multiple-choice test with more than one right
answer (or even no wrong answers, as in the Duke case).42 Such a test is
obviously less probative (or barely probative at all) than a test with only one
suspect.43 There is no real disagreement about this recommendation.

B. Proper Selection of “Fillers”
Second, in any lineup, the suspect should not stand out.44 Generally,
this means the perpetrator or his photograph should not exhibit any unique
features that draw attention to him, and that both the innocent fillers and the
suspect should generally fit the description of the perpetrator.45 Among researchers and policy makers, there is again no disagreement about the need to
avoid suggestiveness in filler selection,46 although some newly adopted poliBULL. 320, 320–21, 328 (1986) (explaining research demonstrating that having more
than one suspect in a lineup dramatically increases the chances of a mistaken identification).
41. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 618–19.
42. See STUART TAYLOR, JR. & K.C. JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT:
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE
RAPE CASE 38–39 (2007); Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 623. In the
Duke lacrosse case, the complainant alleged she had been raped by several members
of the lacrosse team. TAYLOR & JOHNSON, supra. Police presented the complainant
with a photo of the entire lacrosse team and asked her to pick out the assailants. Id. at
38. Because everyone in the photo was equally likely to be a suspect, there was no
way to assess whether she was making an error by picking someone who could not
have been one of the perpetrators.
43. See Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 623.
44. Id. at 624; see also Steven E. Clark, A Re-examination of the Effects of Biased Lineup Instructions in Eyewitness Identification, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 395,
422 (2005) (noting that innocent suspect identification would be significantly reduced
if the innocent suspect does not stand out); R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, What
Price Justice? Exploring the Relationship of Lineup Fairness to Identification Accuracy, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 303, 313 (1980) (noting that courts can have more confidence in identifications from high-similarity lineups).
45. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 624. There are exceptions to this
principle, however, when the suspect himself does not fit the description of the perpetrator; in that case, the fillers should all deviate from the description of the perpetrator
in the same way as the suspect so that the suspect does not stand out. Id.
46. One researcher has raised concerns about this recommendation, but even he
does not disagree with the proposition that suggestiveness of this sort should generally be avoided. See Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform,
supra note 23, at 243. Steven Clark argues, instead, merely that the data suggests that
avoiding suggestiveness in the composition of lineups and photo arrays may diminish
the number of suspect “hits.” Id. Others have responded by noting that a reduction in
the number of “hits” is to be expected – and desired – from a non-suggestive lineup or
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cies continue to fail to embrace the “match-to-description” recommendation.47

C. Unbiased Witness Instructions
Third, prior to showing the witness the lineup, the law enforcement officer should instruct the witness that the perpetrator may or may not be present in the lineup, that the detective does not know who the suspect is, that it
is as important to clear the innocent as identify the guilty, and that if the witness identifies no one the investigation will continue.48 Research shows that
this instruction lowers rates of mistaken identifications in offender-absent
lineups but has little effect on reducing identifications when the offender is
present in the lineup.49 Without this instruction, witnesses naturally surmise
that police have caught the perpetrator and their task is to pick him out.50
They therefore work hard to pick someone in the lineup, even if the real perpetrator is not present.51 This instruction is thus like a multiple choice test
that includes a final option of “none of the above”; without that option, testtakers feel compelled to pick one of the answers presented, but with the instruction they are given license to say nothing fits.52 Again, the consensus on
this recommendation is clear.53

array, because the very purpose of designing the procedure so the suspect does not
stand out is to prevent police from signaling to the witness which individual or photo
to select. See Newman & Loftus, supra note 23, at 262; Wells et al., supra note 23, at
267. Clark, himself, does not necessarily disagree with that proposition, or is at most
agnostic about it. See Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform,
supra note 23.
47. The recent policy issued by New York State’s Municipal Police Training
Council, for example, which was developed by a “Best Practices Committee” in collaboration with the District Attorneys Association of New York, recommends a filler
selection process whereby no one member stands out. N.Y. STATE MUN. POLICE
TRAINING COUNCIL, IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES: PHOTO ARRAYS AND LINE-UPS
MODEL POLICY 2 (Mar. 2015), http://pceinc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/
Eyewitness-Identification-Model-Photo-Array-and-Lineup-ID-Procedures.pdf.
48. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 625.
49. Roy S. Malpass & Patricia G. Devine, Eyewitness Identification: Lineup
Instructions and the Absence of the Offender, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 482, 486–87
(1997).
50. See id.
51. Id. at 489.
52. See id.
53. Clark has cautioned that giving such “unbiased” witness instructions (his
term) do, as one would expect, also have some small impact on reducing the number
of correct identifications. See Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification
Reform, supra note 23, at 243. The effect is expected because it should operate to
reduce the rate at which witnesses will think they must pick someone or do not really
have a memory of who it was and will by luck pick the perpetrator. See id. at 250. At
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D. Double-Blind Administration
Fourth, one of the most important reforms, which a limited but growing
number of jurisdictions are now employing, requires that identification procedures always use a double-blind testing protocol.54 Although the 1999 NIJ
Guide took no position on it, researchers almost universally agree that double-blind testing is the most fundamental of all of the reforms, and the recent
report of NAS identified it as one of the core reforms that is scientifically
valid and settled.55 Essential to any type of objective testing, double-blind
testing (often referred to in the eyewitness context as simply “blind” procedures) refers to the practice in which neither the subject of the test (here, the
eyewitness) nor the test administrator (here, the police investigator) knows
the “answer” (here, which person is the suspect).56 The purpose is to prevent
the tester from unintentionally influencing either the outcome of the procedure or the certainty of the eyewitness.57 This recommendation is not based
upon any doubts about police integrity; rather, it is based on the wellaccepted understanding that people are influenced by their own beliefs, and
that they can unknowingly leak information, which can influence the subject’s responses on the tests and the administrator’s interpretations of the results.58 It is the same principle that demands that any scientific laboratory
testing – such as testing of a new medication – be double blind, so that neither the patient nor the person dispensing the drug and evaluating the patient
knows whether the patient received the real drug or a placebo.59 While some

the same time, Clark does not argue against adopting this recommendation, but simply argues that policy-makers should be aware of this effect. See id. at 251.
54. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 629; Gary L. Wells et al., Recommendations for Properly Conducted Lineup Identification Tasks, in ADULT
EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CURRENT TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 223, 236 (David
Frank Ross et al. eds., 1994).
55. See IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 38, at 106–07.
56. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 629.
57. Id. at 624, 630. The risk of influence in eyewitness identification procedures
is real. See Ryann M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects of Administrator-Witness
Contact on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1106–
07 (2004); Mark R. Phillips et al., Double-Blind Photoarray Administration as a
Safeguard Against Investigator Bias, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 940, 941 (1999); Melissa B. Russano et al., “Why Don’t You Take Another Look at Number Three?”: Investigator Knowledge and Its Effects on Eyewitness Confidence and Identification Decisions, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL. & ETHICS J. 355, 358–59 (2006); Gary L. Wells &
Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses
Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED SCI. 360, 360
(1998).
58. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 629.
59. Id.
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cost may result from requiring a “blind” administrator, those costs can be
minimized or virtually eliminated.60
Significantly, researchers note, the blind procedure does not cost anything in terms of lost valid identifications of the guilty.61 Double-blind procedures lose no probative identification information at all; rather, they merely
prevent lineup administrators from giving potentially suggestive cues that
might lead eyewitnesses to pick out a suspect.62 Identifications in lineups that
are not double blind may not be legitimate identification evidence63 in the
same sense that no one would accept the results of a lineup in which the police overtly told the witness that the suspect is number four and she should
therefore pick number four.64 Accordingly, this reform is almost universally
viewed by researchers, including now the NAS, as among the most fundamental.65
60. Id. at 632. Some smaller jurisdictions may find it difficult to find or assign
an independent lineup administrator who knows nothing about the case. See WIS.
DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31, at 13. But that problem can be resolved. For
example, when using photo arrays (which comprise the vast majority of identification
procedures today), the administrator can be functionally blinded by having the witness look at the photos on a computer screen that is not visible to the administrator or
by having the administrator put individual photographs in separate file folders that are
shuffled before being presented to the witness so that the investigator does not know
and cannot see which folder contains the suspect. See id. at 13.
61. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 625.
62. Id. at 630; D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 797 n.73
(2007).
63. See Risinger, supra note 62, at 798 n.74. Risinger argues that a blind testing
protocol for eyewitness identification procedures (as well as for the forensic sciences)
is one of the best examples of “cost-free proposals” for reform. Id. at 796–97.
64. See Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra
note 23, at 250 (“One can imagine a correct conviction based in part on an identification procedure in which a police officer, convinced of the suspect’s guilt, simply tells
the witness to circle and initial the suspect’s photograph in a photo lineup ‘or else.’”);
Wells et al., supra note 23, at 265 (“If we say that all hits are legitimate, we would be
asked to lament the lower hit rate that comes from not simply telling witnesses which
lineup member they should pick.”).
65. Again, Clark cautions that, in laboratory studies, blind procedures cause
some reduction in the rate at which witnesses make correct picks. Clark, Costs and
Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra note 23, at 252. But as noted
below, well-constructed field studies have subsequently challenged that conclusion.
See note 78, infra, and accompanying text. And even Clark does not argue against
double-blind procedures. Indeed, while noting what he perceives to be a trade-off in
terms of lost identifications, he has written:
The principle behind blind lineup administration is intuitive, simple, and compelling: If one is concerned that police might deliberately or inadvertently leak
their expectations regarding the lineup, a reasonable solution is to prevent the
police from having expectations, a solution that would be achieved through
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E. Prompt Recording of Confidence Statements
Fifth, police should take and record a verbatim confidence statement
from the witness immediately after any identification.66 Extensive research
demonstrates that eyewitness confidence statements, at least those obtained at
some interval after the identification itself, have little relation to accuracy,
because eyewitness confidence is highly malleable and susceptible to taint
from post-identification feedback.67 Even fairly minimal confirmatory feedback can significantly inflate a witness’s assessment of her own confidence.68
To ensure that the eyewitness’s expression of confidence in an identification
is based solely on the eyewitness’s independent recollection, not on any afteracquired information or feedback, police should record the witness’s confidence statement before she has an opportunity to receive any feedback.69
Among researchers, no disagreement has been raised with this recommendation, although in the policy setting, police and prosecutors often push back
against proposals to require prompt recording or confidence statements.

F. Only One Procedure Per Suspect
Sixth, police should exhibit each suspect to any given witness only
once.70 Currently, police frequently utilize multiple identification procedures
with a single suspect to confirm an initial identification, to ensure that the
witness made an accurate pick, or to bolster the persuasiveness of the identi-

blind lineup administration. Simply put, one cannot leak what one does not
know. The principle is good. Data would be better.

Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra note 23, at 282.
66. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 631.
67. See Amy L. Bradfield et al., The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback
on the Relation Between Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 117 (2002); Carolyn Semmler et al., Effects of Postidentification Feedback on Eyewitness Identification and Nonidentification Confidence, 89 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 334, 342–43 (2004); Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing,
Confidence, and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in
Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 324 (1995); Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 620–21; Wells & Bradfield, supra note 57, at 372–73.
More recently, some researchers have suggested that there is a significant correlation
between confidence and accuracy, but only if the confidence statement is recorded
promptly after the identification, before the witness has received confirming feedback. See, e.g., John T. Wixted et al., Initial Eyewitness Confidence Reliably Predicts
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 70 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 515 (2015). This latter
research therefore continues to support the importance of this recommendation for
prompt recording of confidence statements.
68. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 620–21.
69. See Bradfield et al., supra note 67, at 119.
70. State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 594 (Wis. 2005).
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fication.71 Police might, for example, first present the suspect to a witness in
a showup (a one-on-one showup near the scene of the crime) and then follow
that with a photo array, or they might initially display the suspect in a photo
array and then follow up with a corporeal lineup.72 But research shows that
multiple viewings of the same suspect are risky.73 Each viewing of a suspect
alters the memory of the witness and makes subsequent identification of that
suspect more likely, not because the witness accurately remembers the person
from the crime, but rather from the prior identification procedure.74 Thus,
police must understand that they should use the best, most reliable identification procedures the first time because they will only have one opportunity to
conduct a valid identification procedure with each suspect and witness.75

G. Sequential Presentation
Seventh, and somewhat more controversially, many reformers recommend presenting suspects and fillers to witnesses one at a time – sequentially
– rather than simultaneously, as in the traditional photo array or corporeal
lineup.76 The theory behind this recommendation, which is supported by
extensive laboratory research77 and now also by field research,78 but is chal-

71. See id. at 594–96.
72. See id. at 595–96.
73. See John C. Brigham & Donna L. Cairns, The Effect of Mugshot Inspections

on Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1394, 1394–95
(1988); Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., Mugshot Exposure Effects: Retroactive Interference, Mugshot Commitment, Source Confusion, and Unconscious Transference, 30
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 287, 287–88 (2006); Gabriel W. Gorenstein & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Effect of Choosing an Incorrect Photograph on a Later Identification by an
Eyewitness, 65 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 616, 620–21 (1980); Tiffany Hinz & Kathy
Pezdek, The Effect of Exposure to Multiple Lineups on Face Identification Accuracy,
25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 195–97 (2001).
74. See Brigham & Cairns, supra note 73, at 1394; Deffenbacher et al., supra
note 73, at 288; Gorenstein & Ellsworth, supra note 73, at 620–21; Hinz & Pezdek,
supra note 73, at 195–97.
75. See WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31, at 6.
76. See R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary L. Wells, Improving Eyewitness Identifications
from Lineups: Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineup Presentation, 70 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 556, 559 (1985); Nancy M. Steblay et al., Eyewitness Accuracy Rates in
Sequential and Simultaneous Lineup Presentations: A Meta-Analytic Comparison, 25
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 460 (2001); Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at
625–28.
77. See Lindsay & Wells, supra note 76, at 558; Steblay et al., supra note 76, at
459–60.
78. Gary L. Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses: An Experimental Test of a Sequential Versus Simultaneous Lineup Procedure, 39
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups
Using Actual Eyewitnesses]; Amy Klobuchar et al., Improving Eyewitness Identifica-
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lenged by some recent research,79 is that eyewitnesses have a natural tendency to engage in what is known as the relative judgment process. When making selections, people naturally prefer to compare one item to the next, selecting the one that, when compared to the others, best fits their selection criteria.80 In an eyewitness identification context, that selection method can be
problematic if the true perpetrator is not included among the suspects and
fillers in a lineup.81 The relative judgment process will lead the witness to
compare all of the faces presented and pick the one that best matches her
memory of the perpetrator.82 By definition, someone in every lineup will best
match the perpetrator when compared to the others in the lineup. Hence,
according to this theory, the relative judgment process tends to induce people
to pick out that best match, even if the true perpetrator is not present and the
best match is an innocent person.83 Presenting images sequentially rather
than simultaneously makes it more difficult for witnesses to engage in comparison shopping and pushes the witnesses instead to make absolute judgments based upon memory.84
tions: Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 381 (2006).
79. E.g., Karen L. Amendola & John T. Wixted, Comparing the Diagnostic
Accuracy of Suspect Identifications Made by Actual Eyewitnesses From Simultaneous
and Sequential Lineups in a Randomized Field Trial, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY 263 (2015); SHERI H. MECKLENBURG, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS: THE ILLINOIS PILOT PROGRAM ON SEQUENTIAL DOUBLEBLIND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (2006), http://www.isp.state.il.us/docs/
ILPilotonEyewitnessID.pdf. These studies, in turn, are themselves subject to criticism and debate. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells et al., The Flaw in Amendola and Wixted’s
Conclusion on Simultaneous Versus Sequential Lineups, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY 285 (2015) [hereinafter Wells et al., The Flaw in Amendola and
Wixted’s Conclusion] (arguing that Amendola and Wixted’s conclusion was based on
a sample of cases that was unrepresentative in a way that was heavily biased in favor
of simultaneous lineups); Timothy P. O’Toole, What’s the Matter with Illinois? How
an Opportunity Was Squandered To Conduct an Important Study on Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 30 CHAMPION 18, 19–21 (2006) (contending that the Mecklenburg Report was so methodologically flawed as to be meaningless); Daniel L.
Schacter et al., Policy Forum: Studying Eyewitness Investigations in the Field, 32
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2008) (same); Steblay et al., supra note 76 (same); Wells
et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses, supra note 78, at 12–
13 (same). Some law enforcement agencies that adopted the double-blind sequential
reform package also rejected the Mecklenburg Report as methodologically flawed.
See BUREAU OF TRAINING & STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WIS. DEP’T JUSTICE,
RESPONSE TO CHICAGO REPORT ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES (July
21, 2006) [hereinafter RESPONSE TO CHICAGO REPORT], http://www.ripd.org/
Documents/APPENDIX/3/Wisconsin_2.pdf.
80. Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 460.
81. Lindsay & Wells, supra note 76, at 558.
82. Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 460.
83. See Lindsay & Wells, supra note 76, at 558.
84. Id.
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Laboratory research confirms that the sequential method produces fewer
mistaken identifications.85 Some evidence suggests, however, that the sequential method may also reduce the rate of accurate identifications.86 A
meta-analysis of the research suggests that, in laboratory studies, accurate
identifications might be reduced from about fifty percent to about thirty-five
percent.87 But mistaken identifications of innocent suspects are reduced even
more dramatically, from twenty-seven percent to nine percent.88 Thus, the
ratio of accurate to mistaken identifications – the “diagnosticity ratio” – is
superior in the sequential method compared to the simultaneous procedure.89
Although sequential procedures produce fewer picks overall, they improve
the odds that any picks will be accurate.90
A recent, well-constructed field study of 494 identification procedures
in actual cases in four police jurisdictions provides support for the superiority
85. See Brian L. Cutler & Steven D. Penrod, Improving the Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: Lineup Construction and Presentation, 73 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 281, 288 (1988); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Biased Lineups: Sequential Presentation Reduces the Problem, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 796, 800 (1991); Lindsay &
Wells, supra note 76, at 562; R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Sequential Lineup Presentation:
Technique Matters, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 741, 744 (1991); Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 626.
86. See Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 468. Whether the laboratory studies
accurately reflect what happens in the real world is debated. See, e.g., O’Toole, supra
note 79, at, 19–21; Schacter et al., supra note 79; Nancy Steblay, Observations on the
Illinois Lineup Data, AUGSBURG C. (2006), http://web.augsburg.edu/~steblay/
observationsontheillinoisdata.pdf; Gary L. Wells, Comments on the Mecklenburg
Report, IOWA ST. U. (2006), https://public.psych.iastate.edu/glwells/Illinois_Project
_Wells_comments.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2015). Most of this debate arises from a
report on a field study in three Illinois police jurisdictions conducted primarily under
the direction of the Chicago Police Department pursuant to a statutory mandate to
compare double-blind sequential and non-blind simultaneous procedures. See
MECKLENBURG, supra note 79, at 2–76. That report purports to indicate that the nonblind simultaneous procedure produced more suspect picks and fewer mistaken filler
picks than the double-blind sequential procedure. See id. That study’s methodology
was so flawed, however, and its results were so inconsistent, in some respects, with
what is known from other laboratory and field studies, that most experts have concluded that it is essentially meaningless. See O’Toole, supra note 79, at 21; Schacter
et al., supra note 79; Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 468; Wells et al., Double-Blind
Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses, supra note 78, at 12–13. Some law enforcement agencies that adopted the double-blind sequential reform package also
rejected the Mecklenburg Report as methodologically flawed. See RESPONSE TO
CHICAGO REPORT, supra note 79.
87. Steblay et al., supra note 76, at 463. Meta-analysis is a method of compiling
and analyzing the data from multiple independent studies that purport to test the same
phenomenon to obtain essentially aggregate data from those multiple studies. Id. at
460.
88. Id. at 463.
89. Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 626–27.
90. Id. at 627.
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of the sequential procedure. That study found that, in real world settings as
well as the laboratory, the sequential procedure improves the accuracy of
witness picks.91 Importantly, the field study, unlike the laboratory studies,
found no drop-off in suspect picks from using the sequential procedure.
Thus, that field study suggests that the sequential procedure produces fewer
errors, or known-innocent picks (eleven percent),92 than does the traditional
simultaneous procedure (eighteen percent),93 while both produce suspect
picks of approximately twenty-five percent.94 According to this analysis,
therefore, the double-blind sequential procedure might indeed be a win-win
proposition – producing fewer errors with no drop-off in suspect identifications.
The matter is not free from dispute, however. A reanalysis of a subset
of the data from that field study by a separate team of researchers, utilizing a
different analytical methodology, reached a contrary conclusion, suggesting
superiority for the simultaneous procedure.95 That conclusion in turn has
been criticized by the original researchers who collected the field data.96
Because the laboratory studies suggest that the sequential method might
produce some drop-off in accurate identifications, and because some researchers now argue that the simultaneous procedure might be more accurate,
the sequential procedure is not as universally recommended as the other reforms. The NIJ and the NAS, for example, in their 1999 and 2014 reports
(both published prior to the field study reported above), respectively, noted
the research on sequential procedures, but reserved making any recommendation one way or the other on them.97 The 1999 NIJ guidelines observed that
“scientific research indicates that identification procedures such as lineups
and photo arrays produce more reliable evidence when the individual lineup
members or photographs are shown to the witness sequentially—one at a
time—rather than simultaneously.”98 Concluding, however, that there was no
consensus about the sequential procedure, the NIJ made no recommendation
91. Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses, supra
note 78. The research was funded in part by support from the Laura and John Arnold
Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, the JEHT Foundation, and the National
Institute of Justice. Id. at 1 n.1.
92. When considering only the witnesses who made an identification – that is,
excluding those who did not pick anyone – the rate of selecting a filler was an alarming thirty-one percent. Id. at 8.
93. Again, when considering only the witness who made an identification, the
rate of selecting a filler was an even more alarming forty-one percent. Id.
94. Id. at 1.
95. Amendola & Wixted, supra note 79.
96. See, e.g., Wells et al., The Flaw in Amendola and Wixted’s Conclusion, supra note 79 (arguing that Amendola and Wixted’s conclusion was based on a subset
of the data that was unrepresentative in a way that was heavily biased in favor of
simultaneous lineups).
97. EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra note 33.
98. Id. at 9.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

21

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 6

398

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

on the procedure. The 2014 NAS Report, for its part, concluded that, “in
certain cases, the state of scientific research on eyewitness identification is
unsettled. For example, the relative superiority of competing identification
procedures (i.e., simultaneous versus sequential lineups) is unresolved.”99
Despite this lack of unanimity on the sequential procedure, I include it
in the analysis in this Article because it has received a great deal of attention,
and, more importantly, most jurisdictions that have adopted written policies
or reform legislation have included it.100 In particular, the Wisconsin Attorney General’s Office, which created a model policy and procedure that local
jurisdictions throughout the state were encouraged to adopt, and which I analyze in detail in this Article, incorporated the sequential procedure.101 It is,
therefore, part of the package of reforms adopted in Wisconsin, which I assess later in this Article.

H. Limit the Use of Showups
Eighth, although many police policy statements do not address the topic
(focusing instead on photo arrays and live lineups), researchers agree that
showups present special problems of suggestiveness, and that, accordingly,
police should limit their use to only those circumstances in which they have
no alternative.102 A showup is a procedure in which a single suspect is presented for identification within a short time after and in close proximity to the
scene of the crime.103 The rationale for using this inherently suggestive procedure is that police want to obtain an identification of the offender while the
witness’s memory is fresh, or where, for logistical and legal reasons, they
cannot construct a photo array or live lineup.104 “Research indicates, however, that showups produce higher rates of mistaken identification than do simultaneous lineups or sequential lineups, even when the witness is tested soon

99. IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 38, at 104.
100. Jurisdictions that require or recommend sequential procedures include New

Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin. N.J. ATT’Y GEN. GUIDELINES, supra
note 36; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2933.83 (West 2016); WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31, at 1. Numerous individual law enforcement agencies have also independently adopted the procedure,
including police departments in Tucson, Arizona; Santa Clara, California; Monterey,
California; Denver, Colorado; Palm Beach County, Florida; Norwood, Massachusetts;
Baltimore, Maryland; Hyattsville, Maryland; Hennepin County, Minnesota; Ramsey
County, Minnesota; Colstrip, Montana; Charlotte-Mecklenberg, North Carolina;
North Charleston, South Carolina; Austin, Texas; and Virginia Beach, Virginia. Batts
et al., supra note 11, at 9; POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at 9.
101. WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31, at 1.
102. See Wells, Systemic Reforms, supra note 5, at 628.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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after the witnessed event.”105 For this reason, most courts generally view
showups with disfavor, although they nonetheless tend to permit them.106
Police tend to like showups, both because they are easy to conduct quickly,
and because they can use them even where they lack probable cause to detain
the person while they conduct a photo array or live lineup.107 But the research shows that they indeed simultaneously increase the rate of misidentification and reduce the rate of accurate identification.108 They appear to be a
lose-lose proposition, except in those limited circumstances when police can
conduct the procedure almost immediately after the crime, before there has
been significant memory loss, and where, for logistical or legal reasons, it is

105. Id.; see also Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform,
supra note 23, at 244 (finding that, while other eyewitness identification reforms
might cause some drop-off in correct identifications as well as a reduction in false
identifications, lineups are superior to showups both in terms of reduced misidentifications and increased accurate identifications); Dawn J. Dekle et al., Children as
Witnesses: A Comparison of Lineup Versus Showup Identification Methods, 10
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (1996) (discussing the risk of false positive identifications when showup procedures are used with children); R.C.L. Lindsay et al.,
Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential Lineups, and Showups: Eyewitness Identification
Decisions of Adults and Children, 21 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 391, 402 (1997) (discussing the increased danger of false identifications with showups); A. Daniel
Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups and Lineups, 20
LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 459, 475 (1996) (discussing the inferiority of showup procedures to successive lineups).
106. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 658 S.E.2d 428, 430 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (admitting
showup identification despite acknowledging that “one-on-one showups have been
sharply criticized” as being “inherently suggestive”); State v. Wilson, 827 A.2d 1143,
1147–48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (acknowledging the suggestiveness of a
showup, but concluding that it was nonetheless sufficiently reliable to be admissible);
see also United States v. McGrath, 89 F. Supp. 2d 569, 571 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (concluding that identifications made during a showup were admissible); State v. Santos, 935
A.2d 212, 225 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (same). One state supreme court has held that
under its state constitution, showups are so inherently suggestive, and hence unreliable, that showup identifications are not admissible unless police had no reasonable
alternative. See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005). The court elaborated
that a showup will not be necessary whenever police have the time and ability to
construct a proper, non-suggestive live or photo lineup. See id. at 595–96. Thus, in
most cases showups will be impermissible unless police lack probable cause to detain
the suspect for a proper lineup procedure and are faced with a choice of conducting a
showup or releasing the suspect without any identification procedure at all.
107. See Clark, Costs and Benefits of Eyewitness Identification Reform, supra
note 23, at 244.
108. Clark suggests that policy preferences for lineups over showups are supported by the research, because “lineups show lower false identification rates (.11) and
slightly higher correct identification rates (.43) than showups (.18 and .41, respectively).” Id.
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not possible to conduct a properly constructed photo array or lineup procedure.109
In sum, the eyewitness identification reforms present what appears to be
the best case for systemic reform – solid scientific footing, near universal
acceptance, and something for everyone – better evidence for prosecutors and
police and reduced risks to innocent suspects. Yet, as we shall see, reform
has been neither swift nor even.

II. THE CURRENT STATE OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION POLICY
REFORM
Despite general acceptance of most of these eyewitness identification
“best practices,” they have not been adopted uniformly.110 In 2013, the Police Executive Research Forum (“PERF”) conducted a nationwide survey
with support from the NIJ to assess the state of eyewitness identification
practice. In summary, PERF found:
The results of this survey show that law enforcement agencies for the
most part have not implemented the full range of the 1999 NIJ guidelines. Many agencies have adopted a few of the guidelines, but some
guidelines have been adopted by less than half of the agencies. Many
agencies do not have written eyewitness identification policies, do not
provide training to lineup administrators, and do not provide all recommended instructions to witnesses.111

More specifically, PERF found that the vast majority of law enforcement agencies have no written policies112 on showups (76.9%), photo arrays
(64.3%), live lineups (84%), composites (90.6%), or mugshot searches
(92.1%), although larger agencies of 500 or more sworn officers, which presumably do a large proportion of all identification procedures, tend to be
more likely to have them. 113 Just over 40% of agencies reported using standardized written witness instructions for photo arrays, and 46% reported standardized written witness instructions for live lineups.114 Nearly 70% claimed
they permit only one suspect per lineup.115 Significantly, however, most
agencies do not require blind procedures – 69% percent permit non-blind

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at 90.
Id. at xiv.
Scholars have long advocated the use of written policies to guide and improve police performance on a variety of policing tasks. See, e.g., Herman Goldstein,
Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH.
L. REV. 1123, 1126–27 (1967).
113. Id. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at 79.
114. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at ix.
115. Id. at x.
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photo array procedures, and 92% permit non-blind live lineup procedures.116
Likewise, most agencies continue to use simultaneous rather than sequential
procedures – 68% for photo arrays and 65% for live lineups.117 Together,
“the majority of agencies use non-blind simultaneous procedures, which are
considered the traditional approach to administering lineups.”118
As even these data suggest, however, this is not to say that no progress
has been made. Some jurisdictions have incorporated many or all of the best
practices.119 And interestingly, most of these best practices have been adopted since 2010, suggesting that they have been made in response to recent
research-based reform efforts.120 The point of this Article is to assess where
the reforms have occurred and, more importantly, how they were achieved, in
order to provide some insights about effective pathways for effecting change
in police institutions to increase the reliability of the criminal justice system.
In most states, including prominent jurisdictions such as California and
New York, no statewide mandate has materialized to address or consider any
or all of these recommendations.121 Rather, in those states, reform, if it has
occurred, has been ad hoc and local, department by department. Across the
country there have been a few notable leaders in this respect, including police
departments in Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina;122 Austin, Texas;123
Hennepin County, Minnesota;124 Ramsey County, Minnesota; Tucson, Arizona;125 Suffolk County, Massachusetts,126 Madison, Wisconsin;127 Denver,

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at xi–ii.
Id.
In 2006, the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice,
which was created by California State Senate Resolution No. 44, recommended a set
of best practices based on the social science research and urged the legislature to
require the Attorney General of California to convene a task force “to develop Guidelines for policies, procedures and training with respect to the collection and handling
of eyewitness evidence in criminal investigations by all law enforcement agencies
operating in the State of California.” CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE,
supra note 35, at 5.
122. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at 9.
123. Id. at 9, 94.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id.
126. See SUFFOLK CTY. DIST. ATT’Y, MASS., THE REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, http://www.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/the-report-of-thetask-force-on-eyewitness-evidence/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2016); Stanley Z. Fisher,
Eyewitness Identification Reform in Massachusetts, 91 MASS. L. REV. 52, 58 (2008).
127. Winn S. Collins, Looks Can Be Deceiving: Safeguards for Eyewitness Identification, 77 WIS. LAW., no. 3 (Mar. 2004), http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/
wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Volume=77&Issue=3&ArticleID=741.
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Colorado;128 and Santa Clara County, California.129 But those departments
are noteworthy because they have distinguished themselves, not because they
represent the norm.
Where reform has occurred on a broader basis, it has followed several
distinct patterns, with varying degrees of success. The first state to adopt the
reforms in a wide-scale manner was New Jersey.130 That state, uniquely, has
a vertically unified law enforcement system, in which the Attorney General
has direct supervisory authority over all law enforcement agencies in the
state.131 In 2001, then-Attorney General John Farmer directed all law enforcement agencies to adopt a package of “best practices” reforms, including
double-blind sequential procedures “whenever practical” and “when possible.”132 No other state attorney general has similar authority to mandate these
policies statewide.
Other states followed to varying degrees in other ways. As described in
greater detail in the following section, several states, including Connecticut,
Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Vermont and, most recently, Colorado,
Georgia, and Illinois, have mandated some or all of the best practices by statutory directive.133 Others have encouraged law enforcement to study the
matter and produce their own policies and procedures designed to improve
reliability. In states such as Nevada, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin, that has
meant legislation requiring local law enforcement agencies to adopt policies
and procedures of their own choosing to govern eyewitness identification
procedures.134
In other states, such as Rhode Island135 and West Virginia,136 legislatures have appointed task forces to recommend eyewitness identification re-

128. Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 10, 2015, 4:57
PM),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/free-innocent/improve-the-law/fact-sheets/
eyewitness-identification-reform.
129. CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 3.
130. N.J. ATT’Y GEN. GUIDELINES, supra note 36.
131. About the Division, ST. N.J., http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcj/aboutus.htm (last

visited Feb. 22, 2016).
132. N.J. ATT’Y GEN. GUIDELINES, supra note 36. In addition to mandating the
new procedures, the New Jersey State Division of Criminal Justice worked with state
and local agencies to train investigators. A survey in 2003 found that law enforcement agencies were largely, but imperfectly, complying: 84% estimated that they
used sequential procedures “in every case,” and 62% reported that they used blind
administrators “in every case.” POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at
24.
133. See infra notes 191–20 and accompanying text.
134. See infra notes 265–77 and accompanying text.
135. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1-16 (West 2016).
136. In 2007, West Virginia passed the Eyewitness Identification Act, which created a task force to study and identify best practices for eyewitness identification. W.
VA. CODE § 62-1E (West 2016). Part of this Act requires law enforcement agencies
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forms. In Florida, a state Innocence Commission under the direction of the
Florida Supreme Court issued standards recommending that each law enforcement agency file a written policy with the state that addresses the creation, composition, and use of lineups; the use of standardized witness instructions; steps to be taken to ensure that lineup administrators do not influence
the witnesses (the standards stop short of requiring blind procedures); requirements for documenting the procedure; methods of presenting the lineup;
and police training.137 And in Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court in
2011 convened a Study Group on Eyewitness Identification to “offer guidance as to how our courts can most effectively deter unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedures and minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction.”138
As we shall see, these various approaches have produced varying degrees of
success.

III. THE JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE
The traditional response to problems with the reliability of evidence has
been to look to the courts to regulate the flow of such evidence. As an initial
step in analyzing innocence-based reforms, it is important therefore to understand the legal landscape and the extent to which judicial oversight holds a
promise for reform. Unfortunately, as with other types of innocence-based
reform, judicial oversight of the production and use of eyewitness evidence
has largely been a failure – with a few notable recent exceptions that might
offer the promise of more effective judicial oversight.

A. Federal Constitutional Doctrine
Historically, the only oversight of police eyewitness identification practices above the local police agency level was general judicial oversight under
the Constitution.139 When the Supreme Court began to recognize the risks of
eyewitness error in the 1960s, it first approached the problem in a classically
to follow specific procedures when conducting eyewitness identifications. Id. § 621E-3.
137. FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, STANDARDS FOR FLORIDA STATE AND
LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN DEALING WITH PHOTOGRAPHIC OR LIVE
LINEUPS IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION (Mar. 1, 2011, rev. June 15, 2011),
http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/cms/Guidelines/Documents/Standards.aspx.
138. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GROUP ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE JUSTICES 1 (July 25, 2013),
http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/eyewitness-evidence-report-2013.pdf (citing Letter from Roderick L. Ireland, Chief Justice, to Barbara J. Rouse, Superior
Court Chief Justice (Oct. 17, 2011)).
139. The near-exclusive focus on judicial oversight under the Constitution reflects
what Rachel Harmon calls the “conventional paradigm” of police supervision in the
legal literature. Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761,
765 (2012).
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lawyerly way, by recognizing, in United States v. Wade, a right to counsel at
lineups under the Sixth Amendment.140 Because the Court subsequently held
that the right to counsel in eyewitness identification procedures applies only
post-indictment,141 and then only to live lineups and not photo arrays,142 that
right became inconsequential in most eyewitness identification cases. Most
lineups are conducted before charging, and almost all use photos rather than
live persons,143 circumstances in which the Wade right to counsel is inapplicable.
Accordingly, to provide a more broadly applicable protection against
mistaken identification, the Court also constructed a due process standard
applicable to all types of identification procedures at all stages of the proceedings. In the 1970s, in Neil v. Biggers144 and Manson v. Brathwaite,145 the
Court built off of its 1967 decision in Stovall v. Denno146 and held that the
Due Process Clause requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether improper police conduct created a “substantial likelihood of misidentification” and, thus, requires exclusion of eyewitness identification evidence.147
Under Biggers and Brathwaite, the first step in the due process analysis is to
consider whether police utilized an identification procedure that was unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive.148 Even if so, however, under the second
step in the analysis, the identification might nonetheless be admissible if,
despite the suggestiveness, the identification was, in the court’s estimation,
sufficiently reliable.149
Constitutionally based judicial oversight under this legal architecture
generally has been a failure.150 The Court has hesitated to wade too deeply
into regulating police investigation practices, no doubt due to a sense that it
lacks institutional competence in policing matters.151 In part, its reluctance
also stems from recognition of its institutional limitations in another respect –
the Court’s only real tool for regulating eyewitness evidence is to exclude
eyewitness testimony. The Court is unwilling to use that tool too broadly,
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

388 U.S. 218 (1967).
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT, supra note 38, at 23.
409 U.S. 188 (1972).
432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977) (holding use of an unnecessarily suggestive photo
array did not require exclusion of the resulting identification because “indicators of
[the witness’] ability to make an accurate identification [were] hardly outweighed by
the corrupting effect of the challenged identification”).
146. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
147. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 98 (declaring that “[r]eliability [of the eyewitness
identification] is the linchpin” of that evaluation).
148. Id. at 107.
149. Id. at 106–108.
150. See O’Toole, supra note 79.
151. For a thoughtful discussion of the Court’s institutional limitations as a regulator of police, see Harmon, supra note 139, at 772–76.
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recognizing that, while excluding eyewitness testimony might protect against
some false evidence, it will also inevitably prevent juries from hearing accurate evidence. Reflecting this disinclination to keep too much eyewitness
evidence from the jury, the Court in 2012, in Perry v. New Hampshire, wrote,
“[o]ur unwillingness to enlarge the domain of due process . . . rests, in part,
on our recognition that the jury, not the judge, traditionally determines the
reliability of evidence.”152
Moreover, to the extent the Court has imposed due process standards,
those standards have proven ineffectual because the criteria the Court adopted
for assessing reliability are empirically invalid. The Court declared that, in
assessing reliability, the factors to consider usually include: (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime, (2) the witness’s degree of attention at the time of the crime, (3) the accuracy of the
witness’s prior description of the perpetrator, (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness, and (5) the time between the crime and identification.153 The social science research shows, however, that most of those
factors are not good indicators of reliability and, because they are mostly selfreported by the witness, are in fact distorted by the very suggestiveness they
are meant to assess and overcome.154
The court revisited the Biggers/Brathwaite standard for the first time
thirty-five years later, in 2012, in Perry v. New Hampshire.155 While reformers hoped the Court would take this opportunity to update the due process
standard to align it with the developments in social science research, the
Court instead reiterated the flawed Biggers/Brathwaite five-part reliability
test.156 Indeed, rather than sharpen constitutional oversight of flawed eyewitness evidence based on the growing body of research, the Court carved out
large segments of eyewitness evidence that are entirely exempt from constitutional regulation. The Court held that the due process inquiry is triggered
only after improper police conduct.157 Thus, the Due Process Clause offers
no protection against inherently suggestive eyewitness identification circumstances so long as they were not directly created by law enforcement. Given
all of these limitations, eyewitness evidence is almost never excluded, even
when the procedures used are highly suggestive.

152. 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012).
153. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200

(1972)).
154. Wells et al., Why Do Motions to Suppress Suggestive Eyewitness Identifications Fail?, supra note 30, at 169–73.
155. 132 S. Ct. 716.
156. Id. at 725 n.5.
157. Id. at 726 (“The due process check for reliability, Brathwaite made plain,
comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper police conduct.”).
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B. State Court Interventions
A few state courts have been more responsive to the social science research and have demanded more as a matter of state law. For example, in
2005, the same year that the Wisconsin legislature passed its eyewitness identification legislation and the State Attorney General issued a science-based
model eyewitness identification policy, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered whether the Biggers/Brathwaite test should continue to govern admissibility of one-on-one showup evidence.158 Citing the social science research,
the court in State v. Dubose declared that “[t]hese studies confirm that eyewitness testimony is often ‘hopelessly unreliable.’”159 The court held that the
Biggers/Brathwaite approach, which permits admission of identification evidence even if produced by impermissibly suggestive procedures “if the identification could be said to be reliable,” was untenable.160 The court explained:
“Studies have now shown that approach is unsound, since it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for courts to distinguish between identifications that
were reliable and identifications that were unreliable.”161 Accordingly, the
court held that, under the state constitution, admissibility of showup evidence
would be assessed simply on the basis of whether police employed unnecessary suggestiveness; no showing of purported “reliability” could compensate.162
That approach suggested real potential to push law enforcement to adopt
the social-science-based reforms. Under the new paradigm, after all, anything short of “best practices” could be deemed unnecessarily suggestive,
rendering the evidence inadmissible. But the limits of judicial action as a
reform tool quickly revealed themselves once again.163 In subsequent cases,
the Wisconsin courts limited Dubose to showup evidence, rendering it inapplicable to photo arrays, live lineups, or other identification procedures.164
Although the rationale in Dubose was equally applicable to these other types
of identification procedures, the courts proved once again unwilling to intrude
too directly into police practices or to prescribe a rule that might result in
excluding some potentially probative evidence.
Six years later, New Jersey’s Supreme Court even more thoroughly incorporated the social science research into legal doctrine under the state con158. State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005).
159. Id. at 592 (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1262

(Mass. 1995)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 593–94.
163. The limits of courts as change-agents in the innocence context were noted by
Marvin Zalman and Julia Carrano when they wrote that, “because of its constitutional
foundation and institutional conservatism, the judiciary has made few substantial
institutional changes as a result of the innocence movement.” Zalman & Carrano,
supra note 11, at 980.
164. See State v. Drew, 740 N.W.2d 404 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
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stitution.165 In 2011, in State v. Henderson, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
engaged in a deep analysis of the scientific evidence and determined that the
framework then used by the state was inadequate for analyzing the reliability
of eyewitness identification.166 Drawing on the scientific research, the court
listed a number of system variables167 that courts should consider when deciding whether there is enough evidence of suggestiveness to trigger suppression of an eyewitness identification.168 Then, on July 19, 2012, just six
months after the U.S. Supreme Court demurred on its opportunity to reform
constitutional standards in Perry v. New Hampshire,169 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey reaffirmed its commitment to eyewitness identification reform by
releasing expanded jury instructions and court rules addressing eyewitness
identification.170 While the court did not mandate that police use any particular procedures, the court’s heavy focus on the social science research as a
basis for regulating admissibility suggested a new era of judicial enforcement
of science-based best practices.
While the Supreme Court of New Jersey was the first state supreme
court to reject the Biggers/Brathwaite test in all identification cases,171 it was
not the last. Perhaps most dramatically, in 2012, the Supreme Court of Oregon revised eyewitness identification law in State v. Lawson.172 In Lawson,
as in Henderson in New Jersey, the Supreme Court of Oregon extensively
canvassed the social science research and concluded that the Biggers/Brathwaite test was inadequate.173 The Lawson court went on to break
165. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
166. Id. at 918–19.
167. In the taxonomy of eyewitness identification procedures, “system variables”

are those conditions leading to an identification that the system (the police) can control, such as whether police use a photo array or live lineup, whether the procedure is
blind, the nature of the instructions given to witnesses, whether the procedure is simultaneous or sequential, etc. By contrast, “estimator variables” are those variables
that are beyond the control of law enforcement, such as the lighting conditions at the
time of the crime, the witness’s viewing distance, whether the identification is crossracial, etc. See Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testimony Research: System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1546 (1978).
168. The non-exhaustive list of system variables includes blind administration,
pre-identifications, lineup construction, feedback, multiple viewings, showups, and
private actors. Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–21.
169. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (decided on January 11,
2012).
170. Supreme Court Releases Eyewitness Identification Criteria for Criminal
Cases, N.J. COURTS (July 19, 2012), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/
pr120719a.htm.
171. Karen Newirth, New Jersey Leads the Way on Eyewitness Identification
Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT (July 23, 2012, 5:40 PM), http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/New_Jersey_Leads_the_Way_on_Eyewitness_Identification_
Reform.php.
172. 291 P.3d 673 (Or. 2012).
173. Id. at 685–88.
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new ground in several respects. First, unlike prior judicial analyses, the Lawson court relied not on constitutional principles, but on the Oregon Rules of
Evidence to impose constraints on eyewitness evidence and thereby to regulate police practices.174 Specifically, the court drew upon evidentiary rules
limiting witnesses to testimony about matters on which they have personal
knowledge (on the theory that a witness who cannot make a reliable identification might lack personal knowledge),175 rules governing lay opinion testimony (on the theory that an eyewitness identification represents the witness’s
lay opinion), 176 and the rules requiring courts to balance the probative value
of evidence against the risk it presents of unfair prejudice.177 Under those
174. Id. at 691.
175. OR. EVID. CODE, R. 602, like its federal counterpart, FED. R. EVID. 602, pro-

vides that “a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.315. The Court in Lawson held that
[w]hen a criminal defendant raises that kind of evidentiary challenge in a pretrial motion to exclude eyewitness identification evidence, the proponent of
the evidence (in that context, the state) must offer evidence showing both that
the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe or otherwise personally
perceive the facts to which the witness will testify, and did, in fact, observe or
perceive them, thereby gaining personal knowledge of the facts.

Lawson, 291 P.3d at 692.
176. Lawson, 291 P.3d at 692 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.405 (West
2016)); see also FED. R. EVID. 701. The Lawson Court reasoned that “[t]he ultimate
conclusion in an eyewitness identification—i.e., that a defendant on trial is the same
person that the witness saw at the scene—cannot itself be observed, but rather must
be inferred by the witness.” Id. These rules generally require the proponent of lay
opinion testimony to establish that the proposed testimony is both rationally based on
the witness’s perceptions and helpful to the trier of fact. On the former requirement,
“To satisfy its burden, the proponent of the identification evidence (generally the
state) must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the witness perceived
sufficient facts to support an inference of identification and that the identification
was, in fact, based on those perceptions.” Id. at 693. On the latter requirement (helpfulness to the jury), the Court wrote:
Although we anticipate that that burden will be easily satisfied in nearly all
cases, it is conceivable that some statements of identification might not be particularly helpful to a jury. Consider, for example, the witness who observes a
masked perpetrator with prominently scarred or tattooed hands. Although
those features could be distinctive enough to provide a rational basis for an inference of identification, a jury may be equally capable of making the same
inference by comparing the witness’s description of those markings to objective evidence of the actual markings on the defendant.

Id. at 693–94.
177. Id. at 694 (citing OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.160); see also FED. R. EVID. 403.
Other courts have similarly held that the balancing test of Rule 403 can and should be
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rules, the court held, eyewitness evidence is only admissible – as based on
personal knowledge, constituting valid lay opinions, and possessing sufficient
probity – if it is sufficiently reliable as measured by social-science-based
standards. Significantly, the court held that this obligation arises whether the
suggestiveness and unreliability was produced by factors the police could
control (system variables) or factors entirely beyond control of the government (estimator variables).178 The standard thus governs all eyewitness identification evidence, regardless of its source.
A few other state supreme courts have also recognized the problem and
inadequacy of the Biggers/Brathwaite test, but have moved toward reform
more tentatively. As noted, both the Supreme Court of Florida179 and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court180 appointed study groups or task
forces to study the problem of eyewitness identification error and make recommendations for, as the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court put it, how
the courts can “most effectively deter unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedures and minimize the risk of a wrongful conviction.”181
The Massachusetts Study Group examined whether the Supreme Judicial Court should require some of the best practices, including providing
proper witness instructions, recording witness confidence statements, and
utilizing a minimum of five fillers and only one suspect per procedure.182
The Massachusetts Study Group released its report on July 25, 2013, and
recommended that the court:
(1) take judicial notice as legislative facts of certain generally established modern psychological principles regarding eyewitness memory;
(2) support uniform statewide procedures to ensure that all Massachusetts police departments employ best practices;
(3) provide the basis for an expanded pretrial judicial inquiry into the
reliability of eyewitness evidence and an expanded array of remedies
beyond those available for identifications involving suggestive police
practices;

used to weigh the admissibility of unreliable eyewitness identification evidence. See,
e.g., State v. Hibl, 714 N.W.2d 194, 204 (Wis. 2006).
178. Lawson, 291 P.3d at 694.
179. FLA. DEP’T OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, supra note 137, at 2.
180. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GROUP ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra
note 138.
181. Id. (quoting Letter from Roderick L. Ireland, Chief Justice, to Barbara J.
Rouse, Superior Court Chief Justice (Oct. 17, 2011)).
182. The Court had previously urged police to employ those practices. See Commonwealth v. Silva-Santiago, 906 N.E.2d 299, 312 (Mass. 2009); Commonwealth v.
Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195, 208 (Mass. 2011).
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(4) adopt new and expanded jury instructions on eyewitness evidence;
and
(5) establish a committees for educating and training judges and the
bar about the new procedures and for monitoring the evolving science
of eyewitness evidence.183

The following year, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided
two cases in which it advanced the eyewitness identification reform agenda.
First, in Commonwealth v. Crayton, the court established a heightened admissibility standard for in-court eyewitness identification evidence where the
eyewitness had not participated before trial in an identification procedure.184
In that situation, the court held that the eyewitness’s in-court identification
shall be treated as an in-court showup and, thus, only admitted for “good reason.”185 Then in Commonwealth v. Gomes, the court updated jury instructions on eyewitness identification to incorporate “generally accepted” scientific principles such as:
(1) human memory does not function like a video recording;
(2) an eyewitness’s expressed certainty in an identification, standing
alone, may not indicate the accuracy of the identification;
(3) high levels of stress can reduce an eyewitness’s ability to make an
accurate identification;
(4) information that is unrelated to the initial viewing of the event,
which an eyewitness receives before or after making an identification,
can influence the witness’s later recollection of the memory or of the
identification; and
(5) a prior viewing of a suspect at an identification procedure may reduce the reliability of a subsequent identification procedure in which
the same suspect is shown.186

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued finalized model jury instructions based on Gomes’s provisional instructions in 2015.187
183. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT STUDY GROUP ON EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE, supra
note 138, at 2–5.
184. 21 N.E.3d 157, 169–70 (Mass. 2014).
185. Id. at 169.
186. Commonwealth v. Gomez, 22 N.E.3d 897, 911–16 (Mass.), modified, Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 32 N.E.3d 873 (Mass. 2015).
187. Statement, Mass. Supreme Judicial Court, Model Jury Instructions on Eyewitness Identification (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.mass.gov/courts/docs/sjc/docs/
model-jury-instructions-on-eyewitness-identification-november-2015.pdf.
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As this brief description of recent eyewitness identification case law reveals, a few jurisdictions have demonstrated the potential for courts to demand significant reform. But the vast majority of courts, led by the U.S. Supreme Court, remain largely unresponsive to the lessons from social science.
Whether that inactivity reflects enduring institutional limitations on the courts
as regulators of police practices, or merely the conservative nature of courts,
which will eventually give way under the weight of scientific evidence, is still
an open question. Likewise, whether courts in New Jersey and Oregon will
vigorously enforce science-based “best practices” under Henderson and Lawson remains to be seen. As the Wisconsin experience demonstrates (the swift
retreat from the broad promise of Dubose by limiting it to showups), the
courts are quite sensitive to pressures against moving too quickly in the area
of police reform.188

IV. BEYOND THE COURTS: LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTING REFORM
At least thirteen state legislatures have enacted some form of eyewitness
identification reform.189 These reforms range from strict, top-down, “command and control” legislation that mandates one uniform statewide policy to
more flexible, bottom-up legislation that mandates that each agency have a
policy, but allows each agency to adopt the specific procedures it sees fit.
This Article analyzes in greatest depth the latter approach, especially as attempted in Wisconsin and a few other states, which might be characterized as
an experiment in “new governance” or “democratic experimentalism.” But
before analyzing that approach, it is important to outline the alternatives that
have been tried in other states.

A. Top-Down Prescriptive Legislation
1. The Mandates
At least nine states – Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, and Vermont190 – have experimented
with governmental mandates that spell out – at least to some degree – the
specific procedures that police must employ when obtaining eyewitness iden-

188. See, e.g., State v. Drew, 740 N.W.3d 404, 408–09 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
189. These states include Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland,

Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra notes 191–92 and accompanying text.
190. Arguably, Texas could be added to this list because of its legislative provision that, essentially, agencies that choose not to adopt their own written policies will
be bound by the policy created by the Law Enforcement Management Institute of
Texas (“LEMIT”). See infra notes 273–75 and accompanying text.
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tifications.191 Under this “command and control” model, police are directed
specifically on how to conduct their identification procedures – typically including specific requirements that police employ “best practices,” such as
blind sequential procedures.192 While in eight of these states the commandand-control model has been implemented by legislatures, in one, New Jersey,
the Attorney General had the authority, which he exercised in 2001, to mandate a set of best practices procedures. 193 The others – the legislative mandates – are described below.
North Carolina. Spurred in part by one of the nation’s most high-profile
misidentification cases involving Jennifer Thompson and Ronald Cotton,194
and by the leadership of Supreme Court Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, whose
conservative ideals led him to recoil at the notion of the government depriving an innocent person of his liberty,195 North Carolina became the first state
to mandate these procedures by legislation. After the North Carolina Department of Justice, in 2005, experimented with non-mandatory model policies,196 the North Carolina legislature enacted the Eyewitness Identification
Reform Act in 2007, which made mandatory many of the previously recommended procedures, including requirements that identification procedures be
blind and sequential, that witnesses should be given the instructions recommended by the 1999 NIJ guide, that fillers should fit the description of the
perpetrator, that a confidence statement should be documented at the time of
the identification, and that the identification procedure should be videotaped
whenever practical.197

191. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1p (West 2016) (“Not later than May
1, 2013, each municipal police department and the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection shall adopt procedures for the conducting of photo lineups
and live lineups that are in accordance with the policies and guidelines developed and
promulgated by the Police Officer Standards and Training Council and the Division
of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West 2016) (“Lineups conducted by State, county, and other
local law enforcement officers shall . . . be conducted by an independent administrator
[and] be presented to witnesses sequentially.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83
(West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1E-2 (West 2016) (imposing mandatory procedures for eyewitness identifications); 2015 Ga. Laws 173.
192. Supra note 191.
193. See N.J. ATT’Y GEN. GUIDELINES, supra note 36.
194. Jennifer Thompson’s misidentification of Ronald Cotton was featured in
numerous national media stories and ultimately in a best-selling book the two coauthored. JENNIFER THOMPSON-CANINO, RONALD COTTON & ERIN TORNEO, PICKING
COTTON: OUR MEMOIR OF INJUSTICE AND REDEMPTION (2009).
195. See Keith A. Findley & Larry Golden, The Innocence Movement, the Innocence Network, and Policy Reform, in WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM: MAKING JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 93, 100.
196. See N.C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE COMM’N, supra note 35.
197. Eyewitness Identification Reform Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.50–
.53 (West 2016).
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Ohio. Thereafter, Ohio similarly adopted mandatory language requiring
that police comply with a set of specific procedures.198 Ohio’s statute demands that “any law enforcement agency or criminal justice entity in this
state that conducts live lineups or photo lineups shall adopt specific procedures for conducting the lineups.”199 The statute then requires that “[t]he
procedures, at a minimum, shall impose the following requirements . . . .
Unless impracticable, a blind or blinded administrator.”200 The statute does
not list sequential administration as a “specific procedure” but does define the
“folder system” as “a system for conducting a photo line-up” that employs
double-blind, sequential administration.201
Connecticut. A few other states have now adopted legislative mandates
as well. In 2012, the Connecticut Eyewitness Task Force issued a report recommending that the blind sequential procedure be made mandatory, at least
when practical.202 Subsequent legislation watered down the recommendation
and adopted the mandate for blind administration where practical, but not the
sequential procedure, pending further research.203 The statute requires law
enforcement agencies to adopt procedures for photo and live lineups that
comply with minimum standard best practices, including proper filler selection.204
Georgia. After several years of wrangling, Georgia also adopted a prescriptive law.205 The process began in 2008 when the Georgia House of Representatives passed a resolution urging all law enforcement agencies to either
revisit or develop policies and procedures for eyewitness identification.206
At that point, one review of the state’s law enforcement agencies reported
that less than ten percent had written policies in place.207 When that approach
failed to produce sufficient results, and after a protracted period of negotia198. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2933.83 (West 2016) (mandating double-blind and
sequential procedures).
199. Id. § 2933.83(B).
200. Id. § 2933.83(B)(1).
201. Id. § 2933.83(A)(6).
202. EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE JUDICIARY
COMMITTEE OF THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/how-is-your-statedoing/CT_Eyewitness_Identification_Task_Force_Report_February_2012.pdf.
203. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1p (West 2016).
204. Id.
205. Eyewitness ID Powerpoint, GA. POLICE OFFICER STANDARDS & TRAINING
COUNCIL, https://www.gapost.org/eyewitness_training.html (select “Eyewitness ID
Powerpoint”) (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
206. Id.
207. Id.; see also Georgia Improves Identification Training, INNOCENCE PROJECT
(Jan. 21, 2009, 1:49 PM), http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Georgia_
Improves_Identification_Training.php (noting that a 2007 study by the Georgia Innocence Project reported eighty-two percent of Georgia law enforcement agencies had
no eyewitness identification procedures in place).
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tion and debate,208 the legislature adopted a statute that required law enforcement agencies to have written eyewitness identification policies by July
2016.209 The new statute, which went into effect July 1, 2015, requires these
policies to contain best practices, including blind administration, proper filler
selection, witness instructions, and confidence statements.210
Maryland. Following what was perhaps an even more arduous journey,
Maryland similarly adopted a prescriptive law after it became clear that law
enforcement, left to its own devices, was not responding to encouragement to
develop best practices policies.211 Ultimately, the Maryland legislature
amended its statute in 2014 to read in part:
On or before January 1, 2016, each law enforcement agency in the
State shall . . . adopt the Police Training Commission’s Eyewitness
Identification Model Policy; or . . . adopt and implement a written pol208. Georgia adopted its training program directly in response to impending legislation. To help facilitate law enforcement action, the Georgia Public Safety Training
Center developed an eight-hour course on eyewitness identification. Georgia Improves Identification Training, supra note 207. “The goal of [this] increased focus on
the eyewitness identification training is to reduce the potential of error in our identification processes.” Eyewitness ID Powerpoint, supra note 205.
209. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-20-2 (West 2016).
210. Id.
211. Reformers in Maryland first tried, in 2007, to enact a prescriptive eyewitness
identification law that would have mandated double-blind-sequential procedures with
appropriate witness instructions and fillers, along with recording of confidence statements and other elements of the typical reform packages. MD. CODE ANN., PUB.
SAFETY § 3-506 (West 2016); Brown & Saloom, supra note, 17, at 553. At that time,
many police departments in the state had no written eyewitness identification policies
“and many of the written policies that did exist had not been modified in decades.”
Id. Remarkably, “[N]o agency had adopted a written protocol that incorporated the
core best practices that experts have identified as critical to reducing mistaken identifications.” Id. at 554. When it became clear that the supporters would not be able to
overcome opposition from law enforcement, reformers regrouped and succeeded in
passing a bill in 2007 requiring all law enforcement agencies to adopt written policies
that minimally comport with the recommendations issued by the National Institute of
Justice’s Technical Working Group on Eyewitness Evidence. Id. Despite this legislation, a 2011–2012 review of law enforcement policies in Maryland revealed that no
agency had adopted the double-blind-sequential protocol, and that there was “a complete lack of uniformity throughout the state in terms of what particular aspects of the
eyewitness identification procedure were addressed by the policies.” Id. at 555. Negotiations resumed, producing a collaboration between stakeholders designed to promote uniform best practices, and a directive from the legislature for a status report on
the results of this collaboration in advance of the next legislative session. Id. at 557.
Although the Maryland Police and Correctional Training Commission drafted a policy incorporating the best practices, a preliminary analysis conducted by the Innocence
Project in 2013 found that only one-third of agencies responded to the directive to
submit policies, and of those, “only half required the use of a blind administrator, the
single most important reform to eyewitness protocols.” Id. at 558.
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icy relating to identification procedures that complies with § 3-506.1
of this subtitle; and . . . file a copy of the written policy with the Department of State Police.212

At minimum, these policies must include blind administration, witness instructions, proper filler procedure, and written confidence statements.213
Illinois. Illinois enacted a similar statute, effective January 1, 2015, requiring law enforcement agencies to adopt best practices, including: blind
administration, witness instructions, proper filler selection, and recording of
the procedures.214 The law also provides a remedy from failure to comply
with identification procedures, including suppression of eyewitness identification evidence and a curative jury instruction.215
Colorado. Colorado adopted a law effective July 1, 2015, that requires
all Colorado law enforcement agencies to implement eyewitness identification best practices such as confidence statements, blind administration, and
witness instructions.216
Vermont. Taking a slightly different approach, Vermont adopted legislation that constitutes somewhat of a hybrid approach between the “command
and control” approach and the “new governance” approach discussed below.
In 2014, Vermont adopted a statute related to “law enforcement policies on
eyewitness identification and bias-free policing.”217 The law requires all state
and county law enforcement agencies to adopt an eyewitness identification
policy.218 The bill does not mandate any particular policy, but does require
that the policy contain, at minimum, certain “essential elements,” including
protocols for showups, blind administration of photo and live lineups, witness
instructions that inform the witness the perpetrator may not be present, at
least five fillers for photo lineups and four fillers for live lineups, a requirement that all fillers must match the description of the perpetrator, and documentation of the witness’s confidence “in the eyewitness’s own words.”219 I
characterize this as a hybrid approach because it requires agencies to adopt a
policy based on best practices, but also leaves room for agencies to craft
modification and adjustments according to their needs. Senate Bill 184 also
dictates that the model policy developed by the Law Enforcement Advisory

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506.
Id. § 3-506.1.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/107A-2 (West 2016).
Id. 5/107A-2(j).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1-109 (West 2016).
Vermont Senate Bill 184, LEGISCAN, http://legiscan.com/VT/text/S0184/2013
(last visited Feb. 21, 2015); see also VT Governor to Sign into Law New Wrongful
Conviction Reforms, INNOCENCE PROJECT (June 16, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/vt-governor-to-sign-into-law-new-wrongfulconviction-reforms/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
218. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 5581(a) (West 2016).
219. Id. § 5581(b).
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Board, which includes the core best practices, will be an agency’s default if
the agency does not adopt its own policy by January 1, 2015.220

2. Assessing the Top-Down Approach
The advantage of the top-down, command-and-control model is, obviously, that it can dictate best practices and can put the force of law behind
those dictates. As policy advocates with the Innocence Project explain:
There are obvious benefits to legislating police practice reform. A
clear advantage of a statute is that it assures uniformity and consistency in expectations of practice across a given state and accomplishes
this goal promptly, rather than uneven implementation over a protracted period of time. Another benefit legislation can offer is its ability to
provide clear direction to the courts about how to consider eyewitness
evidence that has been gathered in violation of best practices. Finally,
legislation can provide law enforcement with both the resources and
direction for necessary training for improved eyewitness identification
protocols.221

Given police resistance to nudges toward reform, exhibited for example by
the Georgia and Maryland experiences with voluntary policies, the heavy
hand of top-down mandates might be required, at least in some instances.
The Innocence Project, for its part, prefers to work with local law enforcement in a collaborative effort to reform practices, but when that fails, it views
mandatory legislation as a necessary alternative.222
But there are drawbacks to the top-down model. First, because it requires engagement of the political process, and because police and prosecutors often resist and have political clout, adopting such legislation is not politically feasible in many jurisdictions. One reason states like Wisconsin have
gone the route of directing police to develop their own policies, rather than
mandating that they follow legislatively prescribed policies, is that there was
little political will in the legislature to impose heavy-handed or intrusive
mandates on police.223

220. Id. § 5581(d).
221. Brown & Saloom, supra note 17, at 550.
222. Id. (“Having first sought to arrive at eyewitness identification reform by

supporting law enforcement in their efforts to implement it themselves, when we must
turn to legislation we are able to do so with a measure of understanding, and hopefully respect, from the law enforcement leaders with whom we had engaged.”).
223. Kruse, supra note 24, at 713 (citing Interview with Mark Gundrum, Wis.
State Assembly Representative (Feb. 6, 2006)). The Wisconsin statute was the product of compromise and a delicate political strategy engineered by then-Representative
Mark Gundrum, chairperson of a legislative task force created to recommend reforms
to prevent wrongful convictions. Id. Gundrum, a self-proclaimed conservative, law-
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Second, because the best practices are based on social science research,
and that research is continually evolving and developing, there is some concern that writing any particular procedures into a statute freezes the current
state of the science and makes future research-based reform more difficult.224
Third, because legislation is typically drafted at a fairly general level,
legislative mandates tend to be less specific, and hence to some degree less
helpful, than agency-developed policies and procedures.225 In this sense,
rules for conducting eyewitness identification procedures share the characteristics of other administrative agency rules and rule-making processes. Administrative rules are typically relied upon where the requirements for expertise, flexibility, and specificity exceed what can be expected to emerge from
the political legislative process.226
Despite these limitations, a number of states have adopted top-down legislation that is quite remarkable in its specificity. Several statutes mandate
the use of blind sequential procedures; provide detailed instructions on
“blinding” the process by use of such things as the folder shuffle system;227
require specified, unbiased witness instructions; provide specific directions
that fillers should be selected to fit the description of the perpetrator and chosen so they do not make the suspect stand out; prescribe the number of fillers
to be utilized; require prompt recording of witnesses responses and confidence statements; and permit no more than one suspect per lineup.228 The
statutes are far more specific than many policies adopted by law enforcement
agencies on their own.
But statutes can only go so far; there is inevitably a limit to the specificity and depth of legislation. Written agency policies have no such inherent
constraints. The Wisconsin Department of Justice Model Policy and Procedure, for example, in its longest form (it was promulgated in several forms),
consumes twenty-eight pages, and is broader and deeper than any legislaand-order Republican, “knew that gaining the buy-in of hard-line law enforcement
was going to be the key to political success for any proposed legislative reforms.” Id.
224. Id. at 719.
225. Id. at 676–77.
226. Id. at 673.
227. In the folder shuffle system, each of the suspect and filler photographs is
placed in a separate manila folder. “The Folder System”: A Recommended Practice
for the ‘Blind’ Administration of Eyewitness Procedures For Small Police Departments With Limited Resources, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/iscfEr (last visited
Feb. 21, 2016). The folders are then shuffled, two or more empty folders are placed at
the bottom, and the stack is presented to the witness, who opens and examines the
photographs one at a time in such a way that the police administrator cannot see
which photograph the witness is observing. Id. In this way, even if the detective
knows who the suspect is, the detective cannot unintentionally cue the witnesses
when the witness looks at the suspect’s photo. Id.
228. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-284.52 (West 2016); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2933.83 (West 2016) (although Ohio does not mandate sequential procedures).
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tion.229 It provides recommendations on all of the major best practices outlined above, plus others, including specific instructions on topics such as the
use of composite sketches and showups.230 And, significantly, it lays out the
rationale and underlying science for each of the recommendations to help
police better understand and accept the procedures set forth.231
This last point suggests a fourth limitation on top-down legislative approaches. Police culture is notoriously resistant to criticism and change from
outside. Police tend to be insular organizations, whose members value solidarity and a shared identity, exemplified by such things as the “code of silence,” the unwritten rule that prevents one officer from testifying against or
exposing another officer’s wrongdoing.232 As one police scholar has put it,
“[t]he insularity of police institutions and the solidarity of rank-and-file police officers create an impervious shield around these institutions.” 233 Policing tends to engender an “us vs. them” mentality in the relationship between
police and the communities they serve, as well as between the police and
those in governance above them. “The embattled police--the ‘insiders’--view
‘outsiders’ as ‘the enemies who are assaulting . . . the “brothers” on the
force.’”234 Hence, “The rank-and-file officers abhor being second-guessed by
inexperienced bureaucrats unfamiliar with the challenges that the officers
face on a daily basis.”235
This culture might help explain why, as discussed below, in jurisdictions
like Wisconsin and Virginia, where police are free to determine their own
written policies, they are more likely to adopt sequential procedures than
blind administration, even though the science on the latter is more settled.236
Adopting sequential procedures requires some willingness by police to accept
that there is a better way to achieve their goals than they have employed in
the past. While that might be an unwelcome message to some, it pales in
comparison to what many perceive as the insult of requiring blind procedures.
Anecdotally, the response of many police to the requirement for blind procedures is to take offense, misunderstanding the requirement as a reflection of
distrust in the detectives who administer lineups rather than a response to the

229.
230.
231.
232.

WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 3–6.
See David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence Be Contained?, 27
HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 465, 481 & n.60 (1992) (discussing the unwritten “code of
silence”).
233. Kami Chavis Simmons, New Governance and the “New Paradigm” of Police Accountability: A Democratic Approach to Police Reform, 59 CATH. U. L. REV.
373, 378 (2010).
234. Id. at 383 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Andrew E. Taslitz, The Expressive
Fourth Amendment: Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusonary Rule,
76 MISS. L.J. 483, 555 (2006)).
235. Id. at 410.
236. See infra note 318, and accompanying text.
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human condition, and a fundamental tenet of any type of sound testing protocol.
Given this culture – and the basic human tendencies it reflects – reforms
might be more readily accepted if the rank-and-file can be brought on board,
either through training or by being given a voice in creating the policies. As
Herman Goldstein, one of the pioneers of modern policing scholarship, wrote
more than thirty-five years ago about police reform in general:
Traditional programs to improve the police—labeled as efforts to
“change,” “upgrade,” or “reform” the police or to “achieve minimum
standards”—require that police officers openly acknowledge their own
deficiencies. Rank-and-file officers are much more likely to support
an innovation that is cast in the form of a new response to an old problem—a problem with which they have struggled for many years and
which they would like to see handled more effectively. 237

No one has yet studied police compliance with legislative top-down
eyewitness identification mandates. It may be that police are implementing
the mandates fully and effectively. But we know from other contexts – such
as the Miranda requirements – that police can become facile at circumventing
mandates they do not like, either overtly or through more subtle manipulations.238 It is therefore possible that, while the legislative mandates make
good “law on the books,” they are not as effective as “law on the streets.”
Indeed, initial anecdotal evidence suggests that, in some places at least, police
may not be complying widely with the requirements of such eyewitness identification statutes.239
The Ohio experience with mandates illustrates this point. The Ohio
statute, which was adopted in a context that did not involve the kind of law

237. Herman Goldstein, Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 25
CRIME & DELINQ. 236, 258 (1979).
238. See DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 195, 196
(1991) (describing ploys used by police to get suspects to waive their Miranda
rights); Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens When Cops Question Kids, 23 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 424 (2013) (describing tactics police
use “to waive Miranda without alerting them to its significance or consequences”);
Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game, 30
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 259 (1996) (after Miranda, “American police have become
skilled at the practice of manipulation and deception during interrogation”); Robert P.
Mosteller, Police Deception Before Miranda Warnings: The Case for Per Se Prohibition of an Entirely Unjustified Practice at the Most Critical Moment, 39 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1239 (2007); Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
109, 154–62 (1998) (describing the police practice of interrogating “outside Miranda”).
239. E-mail from Mark Godsey, Daniel P. and Judith L. Carmichael Professor of
Law, Univ. of Cincinnati Coll. of Law & Dir., Rosenthal Instit. for Justice/Ohio Innocence Project, to author (Jan. 21, 2015) (on file with author).
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enforcement collaboration that has existed in other states,240 does not explicitly require sequential procedures, but does include provisions on how to conduct photo lineups using the folder shuffle system – a system whose only
purpose is to make identification procedures both functionally blinded and
sequential. Nonetheless, some Ohio law enforcement agencies have interpreted the sequential “folder system” portion of the statute as a suggestion,
not a “preferred method.”241 This decision is bolstered by a statement from
Ohio Attorney General Mike DeWine that “[t]he state legislature did not say
that the ‘folder method is preferred.’ There is nowhere in the statute does it
say that.”242 However, at least one Ohio Court of Appeals has found that the
legislature has expressed a “clear preference” for the folder system.243 Despite this opinion, at least some of Ohio’s law enforcement agencies still use
the “six-pack” (simultaneous) method.244
The point is obvious: one possible drawback to legislatively mandated
eyewitness identification practices is that they may lack police buy-in, which
can undermine their effectiveness.245 It is partly for this reason that some
jurisdictions have attempted reform through less directive processes.

B. Ad Hoc Bottom-Up Reform
One response is to encourage police to sort this all out for themselves.
Indeed, in most jurisdictions, there simply is no organized statewide effort to
implement “best practices.” That is not to say no reform is happening in
those states. Rather, that is to say that if reform is occurring, it is ad hoc and
240. Since the Ohio experience, trainings and symposia have been conducted with
and for law enforcement in states as diverse as California, Georgia, Idaho, Maryland,
Nebraska, Nevada, Utah, Washington, and others. Email from Rebecca Brown, Policy Dir., the Innocence Project, to author (July 18, 2015).
241. See Not All Ohio Police Photo Line-Ups Follow New ‘Preferred’ Method,
WBNS-10TV (Oct. 22, 2013, 10:44 AM), http://www.10tv.com/content/stories/2013/
10/22/columbus-photo-arrays.html.
242. Id.
243. Id.; State v. Humberto, 963 N.E.2d 162, 176 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011).
244. Not All Ohio Police Photo Line-Ups Follow New ‘Preferred’ Method, supra
note 241.
245. Brown & Saloom, supra note 17, at 548. It is indeed for this reason that the
Policy Unit at the Innocence Project prefers to work with law enforcement to develop
best practices policies, reserving legislative mandates for a last resort. As Innocence
Project policy personnel have written:
[I]f police are using reform procedures because they actually embrace them,
they will likely be employed properly and consistently. We similarly recognize
that if eyewitness identification reform is imposed without law enforcement
participation and regardless of their legitimate concerns, the reality is that they
will not likely be implemented either well or consistently.

Id.
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sporadic and almost entirely initiated by police in response to urging by reformers. Indeed, an important paper from the Executive Sessions on Policing
and Public Safety sponsored by the Harvard Kennedy School and the NIJ
argues, “for strong leadership from police agencies to lead reviews of wrongful convictions that can be learning experiences for all components of the
criminal justice system.”246 Specifically included in that recommendation is a
call for police to adopt the range of eyewitness identification best practices
outlined above.247 That approach obviously solves the police buy-in problem.
Unfortunately, to date, it has also meant that in most places not much has
happened.
The recent experience in California reveals the opportunities and challenges of this approach. Work on eyewitness identification reform began in
earnest in California after the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice took up the issue and produced a set of recommendations.248
The Commission was created in 2004 by Senate Resolution 44, with a charge
to study the criminal justice system in California and “determine the extent to
which that process has failed in the past, resulting in wrongful executions or
the wrongful conviction of innocent persons,” to examine potential “safeguards” and “improvements in the way the criminal justice system functions”
and to make recommendations and proposals designed to “ensure that the
application and administration of criminal justice in California is just, fair,
and accurate.”249 Commission members were appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules and included stakeholders from all parts of the criminal justice system.250 In April 2006, the Commission issued its Report and Recommendations Regarding Eye Witness Identification Procedures, which included the full panoply of social-science-based recommended “best practices.”251
The Commission also recommended legislation requiring the Attorney General to convene a task force to develop guidelines for policies, procedures,
and training regarding eyewitness identification procedures, consistent with
the Commission’s recommendations.252
The legislature did indeed pass such legislation, but Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger vetoed it twice.253 In his veto message, Schwarzenegger
asserted that even voluntary state guidelines would interfere with police de-

246. Batts et al., supra note 11, at 2; see also id. at 5 (“We firmly believe that
police departments are the best advocates to catalyze this kind of change . . . .”).
247. Id. at 8–13.
248. CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 35.
249. Id.; S. Res. 44, Reg. Session. (Cal. 2004).
250. See Membership, CAL. COMMISSION ON FAIR ADMIN. JUST., http://www.ccfaj.
org/membership.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
251. CAL. COMM’N ON FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 5–6.
252. Id. at 6–7.
253. Radley Balko, Schwarzenegger Vetoes Justice, FOXNEWS (Nov. 5, 2007),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2007/11/05/schwarzenegger-vetoes-justice/.
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partments establishing their own lineup policies based on their “unique local
conditions.”254
That left eyewitness identification reform entirely up to local control
and initiative, where it remains in California. The results have been spotty.
A few counties have led the way, but most have adopted no reforms.255 In
2003, Santa Clara County became the first to adopt the double-blindsequential protocol, after the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office
approached police with a proposal to adopt the new “best practices.” 256 According to former San Jose Police Captain Scott Seaman (now Police Chief in
Los Gatos, California), the Assistant District Attorney who presented the idea
had credibility with police and told them that the double-blind-sequential
protocol was one of the reforms recommended by the California Commission
on Fair Administration of Justice that he thought made sense.257 After a brief
study, police in Santa Clara County agreed.258
Nine years later, in 2012, Seaman became president of the California
Association of Chiefs of Police (“CACP”).259 He arranged for representatives
of the Northern California Innocence Project and the Innocence Project, along
with law enforcement and social scientists, to present at a workshop for the
state’s police chiefs, at which they explained the science behind the new procedures. Seaman then made eyewitness identification reform part of his
agenda. Every time he spoke around the state, he talked about eyewitness
reform, and he asked each police chief to work with his or her DA to consider
making the reforms. He told the chiefs, “[W]e’re either going to be asked to
do it, or the legislature is going to tell us to do it.”260 Echoing a sentiment
reflected by police elsewhere as well, Seaman said he would be prouder if
police made the changes before they were forced to: “We take it as a badge of
honor if we can get there without legislation.”261 He also talked to the
254. Id.
255. See Maurice Possley, Southern CA Exonerations Don’t Lead to Eyewitness

ID Reforms, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://californiainnocenceproject.org/2013/
01/southern-ca-exonerations-dont-lead-to-eyewitness-id-reforms/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2016).
256. Telephone Interview with Scott Seaman, Police Chief, Los Gatos/Monte
Sereno, Cal., Police Dep’t, former Police Officer, San Jose, Cal., Police Dep’t (Feb.
20, 2014).
257. Id.
258. See San Jose Mercury News: Santa Clara County DA Program Aims to
Boost Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications, ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUST. PROJECT
(Feb. 9, 2012), http://acjusticeproject.org/2012/02/09/san-jose-mercury-news-santaclara-county-da-program-aims-to-boost-reliability-of-eyewitness-identifications/.
259. Chief Scott R. Seaman, POLICE FOUND., http://www.policefoundation.org/
team_detail/chief-scott-r-seaman/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
260. Telephone Interview with Scott Seaman, supra note 256.
261. Id.; see also Peter A. Modafferi et al., Eyewitness Identification: Views From
the Trenches, POLICE CHIEF MAG. (Aug. 17, 2009), http://www.policechief
magazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1926&
issue_id=102009 (“The consequences for inaction are not acceptable; decisions and
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CACP’s Executive Board about the reforms, but he says the Board usually
avoids setting “best practices” until there is really clear agreement on what
the “best practices” are. The Board asked him not to promote the reforms yet
as “best practices,” so they would not have to vote on them; instead, the
Board encouraged him to promote the reforms as “a promising practice.”262
Seaman finished his term as president of the CACP in 2013, and since
then, there has not been much movement in California. As of 2014, only five
of California’s fifty-eight counties had adopted the new procedures, and all
five had done so within the preceding year or two, and all in Northern California.263 Los Angeles County, in particular, has been resistant to the changes
because the District Attorney is adamantly opposed. Seaman predicts nonetheless that all California counties will come around eventually, including
Los Angeles County, when enough DAs begin to pressure their colleagues.
But even Seaman agrees the process will take time. As he put it, “We’re taking a longer and more organic . . . approach [in California].”264

C. “Experimentalist” Bottom-up Approaches
1. The Statutes
A few other states take a middle path, in which they mandate policies on
eyewitness identification procedures, but refrain from prescribing to any significant degree the specifics of those policies. Wisconsin was among the first
to take this approach.
Wisconsin. In 2005, the Wisconsin Legislature passed legislation, by
unanimous vote, mandating that every law enforcement agency in the state
adopt written policies and procedures governing eyewitness identifications.265
More specifically, the law requires each agency to “adopt written policies for
using an eyewitness to identify a suspect,” and it explicitly ties those policies
to preventing wrongful convictions; the law requires that “[t]he policies shall
be designed to reduce the potential for erroneous identifications by eyewitnesses in criminal cases.”266 Beyond that, the law permits local law enforcement agencies to come up with their own policies, with whatever content they
protocols will be decided for us by state or federal legislators and private interest
groups. The worst thing that we can do as leaders is stick our heads in the sand and
hope that the problem will go away. It won’t. As leaders, we need to confront this
issue head on.”).
262. Phone Interview with Scott Seaman, supra note 256.
263. The reform counties include Santa Clara, Alameda, San Francisco, San
Mateo, and Placer. Id. Why those counties in particular have moved toward reform,
and not others in California, is a question that itself deserves scholarly inquiry.
264. Id.
265. Assemb. B. 648, 97th Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005). The reform bill is now codified in several sections of the Wisconsin Statutes. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.50 (West
2016) (relating to eyewitness identification reform).
266. § 175.50(2).
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choose, as long as they at least consider the social-science-based “best practices.”267 At the same time, then-Attorney General Peg Lautenschlager,
through the Wisconsin Department of Justice’s Division of Law Enforcement
Services, Training and Standards Bureau, issued a model policy and procedure that incorporated the full complement of “best practices” recommendations.268
Virginia. That same year, 2005, Virginia adopted a more pared-down
version of a similar law. The Virginia legislation provides in its entirety:
“The Department of State Police and each local police department and sheriff’s office shall establish a written policy and procedure for conducting inperson and photographic lineups.”269 The statute provides no further guidance. In 2010, the Virginia Crime Commission proposed an amendment,
H.B. 207, that would have required agencies to adopt written policies consistent with best practices.270 The amendment failed to make it past the
House Committee on Courts of Justice.271

267. Id. §§ 175.50(3)–(4). The law provides:
(4) In developing and revising policies under this section, a law enforcement
agency shall consider model policies and policies adopted by other jurisdictions.
(5) A law enforcement agency shall consider including in policies adopted under this section practices to enhance the objectivity and reliability of eyewitness identifications and to minimize the possibility of mistaken identifications,
including the following:
(a) To the extent feasible, having a person who does not know the identity of
the suspect administer the eyewitness’ viewing of individuals or representations.
(b) To the extent feasible, showing individuals or representations sequentially
rather than simultaneously to an eyewitness.
(c) Minimizing factors that influence an eyewitness to identify a suspect or
overstate his or her confidence level in identifying a suspect, including verbal
or nonverbal reactions of the person administering the eyewitness’ viewing of
individuals or representations.
(d) Documenting the procedure by which the eyewitness views the suspect or
a representation of the suspect and documenting the results or outcome of the
procedure.

Id. §§ 175.50(4)–(5).
268. WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31.
269. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-390.02 (West 2016).
270. H.B. 207, 2010 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2010); see also Virginia Hopeful for Eyewitness Identification Reform, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Nov. 30, 2010, 5:50 PM),
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Virginia_Hopeful_for_Eyewitness_Identifi
cation_Reform.php.
271. Div. of Legislative Automated Sys., 2010 Session: HB 207 Police Lineups;
Establishes a Uniform Procedure to be Used by All Law-Enforcement Agencies,
VA.’S LEGIS. INFORMATIONAL SYS., https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/legp604.exe?
ses=101&typ=bil&val=hb207 (lasting visited Feb. 21, 2016).
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Texas. Texas has also attempted a legislative approach requiring law
enforcement to develop and adopt written identification policies. In 2011, the
Texas legislature amended the Code of Criminal Procedure to include “Photograph and Live Lineup Identification Procedures.”272 The amendment requires that “[e]ach law enforcement agency shall adopt, implement, and as
necessary amend a detailed written policy regarding the administration of
photograph and live lineup identification procedures.”273 The amendment
further provides that law enforcement agencies may choose between adopting
a model policy developed by the Law Enforcement Management Institute of
Texas (“LEMIT”) or adopting an agency’s own policy that conforms to certain requirements.274 The model policy created by LEMIT offers “sample
standard operating procedures,” including guidelines on sequential and blind
photo arrays and live lineups.275
Nevada & West Virginia. Finally, Nevada and West Virginia have enacted laws requiring law enforcement agencies to adopt some type of written
policy for live and photo lineups and showups.276 West Virginia’s statute
mandates that law enforcement agencies provide written instructions to witnesses, obtain confidence statements from witnesses, and create a written
record of the entire procedure.277 Other permissive language of West Virginia’s statute, however, places it in a hybrid category between “top down” and
“bottom up.”

272. History: HB 215, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE HIST., http://www.capitol.state.
tx.us/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=82R&Bill=HB215 (last visited Jan. 28,
2016); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.20 (West 2016).
273. H.R. 215, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011).
274. Id. Policies that Texas agencies adopt on their own must be based on “credible field, academic, or laboratory research on eyewitness memory” and must address
the selection of filler photographs, witness instructions, preservation of evidence, and
administration procedures. Id. The Maryland legislature enacted a similar statute that
states, “On or before December 1, 2007, each law enforcement agency in the State
shall adopt written policies relating to eyewitness identification that comply with the
United States Department of Justice standards on obtaining accurate eyewitness identification.” MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-506(a) (West 2016). Maryland requires each law enforcement agency to file its policy with the Department of State
Police. Id. § 3-506(b).
275. Model Policy on Eyewitness Identification: Frequently Asked Questions,
LAW ENFORCEMENT MGMT. INST. TEX. 1, 4–5, http://www.lemitonline.org/
publications/documents/ewid_faq.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2016) (“The LEMIT model
policy was drafted in response to § 3(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure,
which required LEMIT to ‘develop, adopt, and disseminate to all law enforcement
agencies in this state a model policy . . . regarding the administration of photograph
and live lineup identification procedures.’”).
276. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.1237.1 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 621E-3 (West 2016).
277. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1E-2 & 62-1E-3.
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2. Assessing the Experimentalist Model
Like any approach to reform, the experimentalist model has its advantages and disadvantages. The risk of this approach, of course, is that local
police agencies might ignore the scientific research and adopt policies that
merely codify old, ineffective practices. But the advantage is that police
might examine the scientific research and find ways to implement it in procedures that local police fully buy into and that accommodate local circumstances and needs. Moreover, this approach offers the potential for retaining
the flexibility to adapt practices to changes in the science and to allow creativity and experimentation in ways for implementing the scientific principles,
fulfilling essentially the promise of the states (or even local agencies) to serve
as laboratories of experimentation.278
In this sense, this hybrid approach reflects some of the values and principles underlying theories of “New Governance” and, in particular, the variant known as “Democratic Experimentalism.”279 As Katherine Kruse, who
has analyzed the Wisconsin reforms under the democratic experimentalist
paradigm, has explained:
Democratic experimentalism eschews top-down “command-andcontrol” regulation in favor of allowing practices to be developed
from the bottom-up through provisional and localized problem solving, and embeds these local problem-solving efforts within larger
structures of transparency that promote accountability and crossjurisdictional learning.280

New Governance in general is viewed as a move away from processes
of regulation in which experts formulate and impose rules upon those whom
278. The reference to states as laboratories of experimentation is attributed to
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann. 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
279. “Democratic experimentalism,” as a part of a larger body of “new governance” scholarship, has been theorized broadly as a new or emerging paradigm in administrative agency regulation. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); Bradley C.
Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting
as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471 (2004); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging
Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
183 (2003); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004); Charles
F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation
Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004); William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs.
Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 127 (2004).
280. Kruse, supra note 24, at 648; see also Karkkainen, supra note 279, at 473–
74.
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they regulate toward more “decentralized, flexible, and pragmatic approaches
that seek participation from regulated industries or agencies in formulating
the rules that govern them.”281 While police have not traditionally been
viewed as administrative agencies, increasingly, scholars are recognizing that
police operate like administrative agencies and are applying the democratic
experimentalist paradigm to them.282 Indeed, nearly fifty years ago the influential police scholar Herman Goldstein recommended recognizing the police
as an administrative agency with important policy-making responsibilities;283
applying New Governance and Democratic Experimentalist theories of agency regulation to the police builds on that early prescription for improving
policing in a complex world.
The experimentalist model is premised on the belief that the old, expertbased, top-down regulatory model resulted in static, “‘one-size-fits-all rules’
instead of nuanced responses to policy problems.”284 The theory is that the
flexibility and openness of decentralized experimentation will lead to more
democratic legitimacy accompanied by an expansion of knowledge and hence
more effective responses to problems, which are amenable to constant revision and improvement.
Several features of this paradigm are of particular salience in the eyewitness identification context. The experimentalist model is dependent for
improved policymaking on information sharing, benchmarking to best practices, citizen engagement, and transparency and accountability.285
Benchmarking refers to the practice of surveying reform models in other
jurisdictions to identify those procedures that are superior to those the agency
might otherwise use and that can be borrowed or adapted for use in the local
jurisdiction.286 Benchmarking can occur through informal sharing of information, or more formally through cross-jurisdictional or national coordinating
agencies that gather information about and evaluate local problem-solving
approaches.287 In the eyewitness identification context, benchmarking is a
prominent feature of the reform efforts, as the social science research has
281. Kruse, supra note 24, at 673.
282. E.g., id.; Garrett, Judging Innocence, supra note 31; Simmons, supra note

233, at 376 (“Modern police departments function like administrative agencies, and as
such, they are susceptible to the same deficiencies that traditional agencies experience
in other administrative contexts.”); id. at 400 (citing Michal Tamir, Public Law as a
Whole and Normative Duality: Reclaiming Administrative Insights in Enforcement
Review, 12 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 43, 44 (2006)) (“Although rarely viewed through the
lens of administrative law, police departments operate in a manner similar to traditional regulatory agencies.”); Archon Fung, Accountable Autonomy: Toward Empowered Deliberation in Chicago Schools and Policing, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 73 (2001).
283. Herman Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving
Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1130 (1967).
284. Simmons, supra note 233, at 405.
285. Kruse, supra note 24, at 677; Simmons, supra note 233, at 406.
286. Kruse, supra note 24, at 680; Simmons, supra note 233, at 406.
287. Kruse, supra note 24, at 680.
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spawned numerous model policies and procedures, from which local jurisdictions can borrow.288
Indeed, to some extent, the prominence of accepted science-based best
practices in this field is in tension with the democratic experimentalism ideal.
The best practices are so well developed, based on expertise generated and
recognized at high levels of academia and government, that the goal of the
reform efforts is to a large extent trying to find ways to get local actors to
simply adopt and apply them. In that sense, the reform efforts do not much
resemble local experimentation at all, and they have the familiar feel of the
old, top-down, command-and-control governance models. Reformers know
what they want the local rules and practice to look like; they are just looking
for ways to get police to adopt them and accept them.
While there is considerable truth to this, the reality is that there remains
room for localized experimentation. For example, while the best practices
call for blind protocols, there is plenty of room for experimenting about how
best to make the procedures blind. The most straightforward way to create
blind procedures is to use a lineup administrator who does not know who the
suspect is. But many jurisdictions, especially smaller ones, find this method
beyond their means, as they do not have the resources to find or use an extra
individual who does not know about the case. To solve this problem, many
jurisdictions have adopted alternatives such as the folder shuffle method described above,289 which permits a detective who knows everything about the
case to conduct the procedure, because the folders effectively blind her from
knowing which image the witness is observing when he makes his identifications.290 Still, others have developed procedures utilizing laptop computers
that use self-guiding software to conduct the procedures, effectively eliminating any police personnel from the process.291 Another advantage of the laptops is that the software is then capable of recording in minute detail important data about the identification procedure – from the sequence of the
photos viewed to the witness’s response times on each photograph, the ex288. See supra notes 286–87 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
290. While the folder shuffle method can be viewed as a local adaptation to na-

tionally set best practices, it was itself to a large extent the brainchild of a group of
experts working at the national level. Gary Wells explains:
The origins [of the folder shuffle method] go back to the Technical Working
Group that wrote the DOJ [NIJ] Guide that was published in 1999. It was a
late night brainstorm by the psychologists in the group. Our idea was to counter the claim of the other members of the group that there was no way to do a
blind process in smaller departments.

E-mail from Gary Wells, Distinguished Professor of Psychology and the Wendy and
Mark Stavish Chair in Soc. Scis. at Iowa State Univ., to author (Jan. 21, 2015) (on file
with author).
291. See generally Wells et al., Double-Blind Photo-Lineups Using Actual Eyewitnesses, supra note 78.
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pressions on the witness’s face, and the exact words used by the witness in
the process.292 As we shall see, local jurisdictions are experimenting with
alternative packages of reforms as well as various sequences for implementing them and unique ways of defining them and training their officers to use
them. Considerable experimentation and adaptation is possible.
The experimentalist paradigm fits only loosely in other respects as well.
Citizen engagement, for example, is an ideal that is generally realized only in
modified form in this context. In other related contexts, such as efforts to
reform police misconduct (e.g., excessive use of force), citizen involvement is
often seen as a critical part of the democratic experimentalist model. Citizen
engagement not only adds political legitimacy to policy reforms, but it is
helpful in minimizing the “us vs. them” mentality that can mark the policecitizen relationship.293 In the eyewitness identification context, however,
there is very little direct citizen involvement in the rule-making process itself.
The procedures just are not visible enough or salient enough to most people
to activate much citizen engagement. But the procedures do matter to police
investigators on the streets, so the bottom-up process does produce local police engagement, which can help minimize the “us vs. them” attitude that
fosters resistance to meddling from outside “experts.”
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to realizing the experimentalist ideal in the
eyewitness identification context, however, is that, in their current iterations,
the eyewitness identification reforms lack effective mechanisms for ensuring
accountability or “continuous change and improvement.”294 Democratic experimentalism is premised to a large degree on the notion that systems of
transparency and accountability will operate to ensure that the experimenting
continues, that knowledge continues to grow as local jurisdictions continually
monitor the landscape and adopt evolving best practices. It depends on “an
interactive process in which higher-level authorities give lower-level ones
autonomy, and the lower-level ones give the higher ones information that can
then be used in a process of continuous monitoring and improvement through
bench-marking and emulation of best practices.”295
The bottom-up eyewitness identification reform efforts to date generally
have weak or nonexistent mechanisms for ensuring accountability and shar292.
293.
294.
295.

For an illustration of the laptop computer model in field work, see id. at 4–6.
Simmons, supra note 233, at 409.
Id. at 410.
Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalism for Liberals?, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 357, 358 (2003) (emphasis added). As Karkkainen has put it,
What is required . . . , democratic experimentalists argue, is a centrally coordinated and monitored system of parallel local experiments, networked and disciplined through structured information disclosures and monitoring requirements,
subject to rolling minimum performance benchmarks but otherwise free to experiment in a continuous and ceaseless effort to improve, learn, and revise.

Karkkainen, supra note 279, at 485.
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ing of information, which democratic experimentalists deem essential to ensuring continual change and advancement of knowledge.296 Many states
simply mandate that local law enforcement agencies adopt “best practices,”
sometimes referencing other model policies as benchmarks.297 But in some,
no one has any responsibility for oversight or for evaluating the policies or
their effectiveness, or often even for collecting them. While some states include a provision for centralized collection, in others, one has to file an Open
Records or Freedom of Information Act request in each local jurisdiction –
and there are nearly 600 independent police jurisdictions in Wisconsin alone
– to obtain a copy of each written policy. Wisconsin’s statute does require
that agencies revisit and reissue their policies every two years,298 but there is
no mechanism to ensure that police actually rescan the environment to ensure
that their policies are really state of the art. It is doubtful that busy police
departments, once having adopted a written policy, do much to assess its efficacy and compliance with evolving scientific research.
The only real accountability mechanism under most eyewitness identification reform plans – beyond centralized collection of the policies in some
states – is case-by-case litigation. The courts become the default oversight
institution. That mechanism, however, is a weak one. It depends in most
jurisdictions on the ineffectual federal due process standards under Biggers
and Brathwaite. In jurisdictions that have adopted written identification policies, it largely remains to be seen whether or to what extent courts will incorporate those written policies into their due process analyses. Absent that, in
most jurisdictions it is unclear if courts will separately enforce compliance
with the policies through suppression. And it remains to be seen whether
courts will rigorously (or at all) evaluate the adequacy of the written policies
in light of the social science research. It is, for example, unclear whether
courts in jurisdictions such as Oregon or New Jersey, where the supreme
courts have demanded attention to the social science research, will continue
to adapt to evolving social science standards. And case-by-case litigation by
its nature suffers the deficiency of relying upon the skill, knowledge, and
assertiveness of defense lawyers, prosecutors, and judges on matters that lie
well outside their formal legal training and expertise.
There was some hope that courts in Wisconsin might take an active role
in the democratic experimentalist approach when the Wisconsin Supreme
Court decided State v. Dubose.299 As discussed, Dubose jettisoned the ineffectual Biggers/Brathwaite due process test for admissibility of eyewitness
evidence and instead created a test that promised to demand police use of best
practices.300 The court held that identification evidence would be inadmissible, regardless of what a court thought about its ultimate reliability, if police
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Karkkainen, supra note 279, at 485.
Kruse, supra note 24, at 680.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.50(3) (West 2016).
699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005).
Id. at 594–97.
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used “unnecessarily suggestive” procedures.301 Because the local identification policies adopted pursuant to the state statute would be a logical starting
point for assessing unnecessary suggestiveness, judicial review could have
become an effective enforcement tool. Moreover, to the extent that a local
agency were to adopt identification policies that conflict with the Wisconsin
Department of Justice Model policies and with accepted best practices, review for “unnecessary suggestiveness” might even have provided an opportunity for compelling local jurisdictions to either defend their use of their
procedures or find ways to incorporate more science-based best practices.
Thus, as Katherine Kruse observed shortly after the new eyewitness identification regime went into place, “[t]he new state constitutional due process
standard announced in Dubose can be seen as reinforcing the experimentalist
structure of the legislation.”302
Kruse, however, was skeptical of the efficacy of this accountability
mechanism,303 and her skepticism now appears prescient. As noted, despite
the promise and the apparent applicability of the logic of Dubose, Wisconsin
courts subsequently backed away from any role they might have played in
generally holding police accountable for adopting and implementing best
practices by limiting Dubose to showup identifications. And while Wisconsin courts have looked at the Wisconsin Department of Justice Model Policies
and Procedures, and some of the policies adopted at the local level, they have
not found non-compliance with those policies to provide an independent basis
for suppression of the eyewitness evidence.304 There does not appear to be an
effective mechanism for systematic oversight, accountability, and information
sharing under the Wisconsin regime.
The existing eyewitness identification reform models are thus imperfect
fits within the democratic experimentalist paradigm. But that is hardly unusual, as scholars have observed that there probably is no system that perfectly
embodies the new governance model.305 And despite some of the tensions,
democratic experimentalism theory provides some useful guidance for policy-makers attempting to implement bottom-up approaches to eyewitness
identification reform. Most fundamentally, the bottom-up approach captures
at least one of the key features of democratic experimentalism: the notion that
301. Id. at 594–95.
302. Kruse, supra note 24, at 689.
303. Id. at 650 (“[A]lthough Wisconsin’s innocence reforms are promising, they

lack an adequate institutional structure to sustain a process of continuous reform. The
only mechanism that the reforms provide for holding local law enforcement agencies
accountable to the experimentalist goals of cross-jurisdictional learning and public
accountability is the exclusionary rule in individual cases.”).
304. E.g., State v. Drew, 740 N.W.2d 404, 406, (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) (affirming
trial court ruling rejecting the “argument that suppression was required because the
photo array procedure did not conform to the ‘Model Policy and Procedure for Eyewitness Identification’ issued by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG)”).
305. Kruse, supra note 24, at 674; Simmons, supra note 233, at 419; Tushnet,
supra note 295, at 358.
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participatory policy-making enhances the chances for buy-in and hence effective reform in practice. As Kruse put it, “The experimentalist governance
paradigm promises that by being more closely involved in a collaborative and
ongoing process of creating and revising the rules that govern their behavior,
local actors will be more invested in complying with them.”306
All of this suggests reasons to be both optimistic and pessimistic about
the effectiveness of the reform efforts. In the next Part, I engage more directly the key question circulating around all of this: How well has the democratic experimentalist experiment (and the other reform efforts) worked in practice? To address this question, I compare data from several states, most
prominently Wisconsin, to the national data collected by PERF and similar
data collected in several other specific states.

V. PRELIMINARY DATA ON THE REFORM EFFORTS
Because no one has yet systematically examined actual police practices
under these various reform regimes, data do not yet exist to assess whether
top-down or bottom-up approaches, or something in between, is most effective at reforming actual police conduct. That research needs to be done and is
forthcoming. In the meantime, preliminary conclusions about reform efforts
can be reached by analyzing what law enforcement agencies say, in writing,
as a matter of policy their officers should do. For top-down approaches, that
analysis requires little more than reading the legislative (or in the case of New
Jersey, the Attorney General’s) directives. Those directives (laws) are discussed above. For bottom-up or democratic experimentalist approaches, the
task is a bit more complicated, because it requires collecting and analyzing
each agency’s policies. In this Part, I present and analyze that data.

A. National Comparisons
The first goal of the democratic experimentalist model is to engage local
actors in the problem-solving enterprise. As a starting point for assessing the
model’s impact, it is useful first to understand the level of police-agency policy engagement on eyewitness identification across all jurisdictions.
Figure 1 shows that, nationwide, 64% of all law enforcement agencies
have adopted some form of written eyewitness identification policy; this is a
national average across top-down, bottom-up, and no reform jurisdictions.307
Figure 1 also presents comparative data on rates of adopting identification
policies for those individual states where such data has been collected, ranging from a low of 9% in Pennsylvania in 2011, to a high of 95% in Wisconsin
in 2012-13.
306. Kruse, supra note 24, at 683 (citing Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 23–24 (1997)); see Simmons,
supra note 233, at 410.
307. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 20, at vii.
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FIGURE 1:
Police Adoption of Eyewitness Identification Policy308
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

* Data collected before Georgia began serious reform efforts.
** Data were collected before the Florida Innocence Commission and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement issued suggested guidelines.
*** Data collected prior to several local efforts to encourage California police
to voluntarily adopt best practices.
**** Data collected before the Michigan Council on Law Enforcement Standards voluntarily adopted standards requiring departments to implement new policies
for eyewitness identification procedures.
***** Georgia data reflects large jump in rate after Georgia pursued a voluntary
training program for law enforcement. The data precedes a 2015 statute that requires
agencies to adopt written policies that contain scientifically supported best practices.

These data show that the trend, over time, is toward greater adoption of
eyewitness identification policies. That suggests that reform efforts are working, at least to some extent. Time alone does not entirely capture what is
happening though, as significant disparities remain between states sampled at
the same time.

308. Sources: GA. INNOCENCE PROJECT, LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEY (2007) (on
file with author); INNOCENCE PROJECT OF FLORIDA, LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY
POLICE SURVEY (2010); TEMPLE UNIVERSITY LAW, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
POLICY SURVEY (2010); NEBRASKA INNOCENCE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION POLICY SURVEY; NORTHERN CALIFORNIA INNOCENCE PROJECT, FOIA
EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION POLICY SURVEY (2010–2011); NEW ENGLAND
INNOCENCE PROJECT, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION POLICY SURVEY (2011–2013);
STATE BAR OF MICH., EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION TASK FORCE (2012) (on file with
author); Brandon L. Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices: A Virginia Case Study, 2 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 9 (2014) [hereinafter Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices].
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It is of course impossible to know from this data with any certainty what
else accounts for these disparities. Part of it may be regional and cultural
differences. Part may be political. But at least some of the differences appear
to reflect the impact of the statutes.
Those jurisdictions that mandate written policies do indeed have higher
rates of agency-adopted policies. Of these states, the three with the highest
agency-adopted policy rates are Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Virginia (set
forth as a separate cluster to the right in Figure 1). These are the three states
that mandate policies.309 Wisconsin and Virginia do it by laws that require
police to adopt policies of their choosing;310 Massachusetts does it by judicial
action. At the time the data were collected, none of the other states had any
policy mandates. To the extent Wisconsin, Massachusetts, and Virginia represent experiments in democratic experimentalism, the data suggest that at its
most basic level, the experiment is working – it does indeed generate greater
local engagement with policy development. A deeper dive into the policies in
the next Part of this Article reveals that, in other respects, the experiment is
indeed advancing the reform agenda, albeit imperfectly.

B. Democratic Experimentalism: The Wisconsin Data
Because Wisconsin was a pioneer in the democratic experimentalist approach to eyewitness identification reform, I collected data on police policies
in Wisconsin so that I could begin to assess its effectiveness. I submitted
Open Records Law311 requests to all 562 law enforcement agencies in the
state,312 asking that they send me their written eyewitness identification policies and procedures. I sent the first request in September 2007, nine months
after the eyewitness identification law went into effect. To increase the response rate, I submitted follow-up requests for copies of the written policies
to all the agencies again in 2012. This time, in an attempt to get greater cooperation, Captain Victor Wahl of the Madison Police Department joined me
in making the request.313 I followed this up with another letter in 2013 to
agencies that had not yet responded, and then my research assistant followed
that up with phone calls to target non-responders to encourage them to submit
309. See supra notes 184–87, 266–72 and accompanying text.
310. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 175.50(4)–(5) (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-

390.02 (West 2016).
311. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 19.31–.39 (West 2016).
312. The Wisconsin Department of Justice provides contact information for 72
sheriff’s offices, 476 police departments, 13 university police departments, and 1
municipal police department.
WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WISCONSIN LAW
ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORY (Feb. 28, 2014), https://wilenet.org/html/directory/LawEnforcement-Directory-2014-02-28.pdf.
313. Captain Wahl is a member of the Advisory Board of the Wisconsin Innocence Project (“WIP”) at the University of Wisconsin Law School. WIP’s New Advisory Board, U. WIS. L. SCH. (July 25, 2011), http://www.law.wisc.edu/fjr/whats_new/
news/ipnewboard2011.html. I am faculty co-director of WIP.
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their policies. In total, we received responses from 366 police agencies
(65.1%), which included the vast majority of the larger city police departments and 94.4% of the county sheriff’s departments. Of those agencies that
responded, 349 (95.4%) indicated that they had a written policy and provided
a copy of that policy.

1. Policy Dates
As an initial matter, while imperfect, the Wisconsin data add weight to
the conclusion that the high adoption rates are at least in part the product of
the legislative demand. Many of the written policies note the date they were
adopted. Figure 2 shows that, of all of the written policies, 81.1% (293 of
349) of the policies (or at least their most recent iterations) either bore no date
or were adopted after January 1, 2007, when the legislative requirement went
into effect, suggesting that many were adopted (or revised) directly in response to the legislation.314 Of those, 9.7% (34 of 349) bore a date between
January 1, 2007, and September 13, 2007 – that is, after the law went into
effect but before I submitted my first Open Records request. Another 46.1%
(161 of 349) adopted policies dated after September 13, 2007, after the agencies received that first Open Records request. These dates suggest that many
of these agencies first adopted their policies only after they were asked to
produce a copy. Indeed, a number of agencies candidly admitted that they
were unaware of the statutory requirement until my request alerted them to it.
Were it not for this research, many likely would not have adopted policies, at
least not as soon as they did.
This experience also confirms the importance of providing oversight responsibility to someone other than the law enforcement agencies themselves
to ensure that they know about and comply with the policy requirement.
These data support Kruse’s observation that the experimentalist approach in
Wisconsin, while promising, is incomplete because it lacks adequate mechanisms for oversight, feedback, and accountability. While filing Open Records
requests can play a role in ensuring accountability, it is a haphazard mechanism at best.

314. See 2005 Wis. Legis. Serv. 528 (setting effective date of the statute at January 1, 2007).
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FIGURE 2:
Dates of Wisconsin Police Agency Written Policies
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2. Policy Adoption Rates
Looking in more detail at Wisconsin, the data in Figure 3 show widespread but incomplete compliance with the law and with the social-sciencebased model policies. Of the 349 Wisconsin police agencies that have a written policy, 257 (73.6%) explicitly reference the statutory objective of reducing misidentifications. Two hundred and ninety-nine of the written policies
cover live lineup procedures, representing 81.7% of all (366) responding
agencies, and 85.7% of all (349) responding agencies that have any sort of
policy.315 All but one – 348 out of 349 – of the policies address photo array
procedures – representing 99.7% of all Wisconsin agencies that have any
policies, and 95.1% of all (366) responding agencies. A surprisingly large
number of agencies (334) include policies on showup procedures, representing 95.7% of agencies that have any policies and 91.3% of all responding
agencies. A much smaller number (202) have written policies on the use of
composite sketches, representing 57.9% of agencies with any policies and
55.2% of all responding agencies.

315. Fifty of the 349 agencies that responded with polices did not include procedures for live lineups. Eleven agencies specifically stated that they do not use live
lineups. Nine stated that live lineups are only allowed with the approval or assistance
of a supervisor or the District Attorney’s office. Two police departments use the
county sheriff’s department’s facilities and procedures for live lineups. Finally, 28
written policies did not provide procedures for live lineups and did not explain why.
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FIGURE 3:
Wisconsin Police Agencies with Written Policies
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3. Policy Source
Other data from the Wisconsin policies reveal that, consistent with the
democratic experimentalist ideal, local agencies have engaged in at least
some localized experimenting. The Wisconsin Attorney General actually
promulgated not one, but two model policies. One, the “long version,” spanning twenty-eight pages, provided an in-depth analysis of the social science
research and a list of six critical recommendations.316 The other, the “short
version,” at a mere three pages, was meant to be a short-hand reference for
busy law enforcement agencies.317 It provided a condensed, shorter alternative that the law enforcement agencies could adopt and modify for their own
departments’ policies. The “short version” addressed photo arrays, live
lineups, showups, and composites and recommended double-blind and sequential procedures. It did not, however, explicitly endorse the “folder system” if an independent administrator was unavailable. Figure 4 shows that,
of those agencies that adopted any sort of policy, 73 (20.9%) adopted the
“short version” of the model policy, 19 (5.4 percent) adopted the entire “long
version,” 111 (31.8%) adopted a policy that incorporated part of either the
long or short version, and 146 (41.8%) adopted no form of the model policy.
Thus, while a majority of local departments borrowed either partially or fully
from the DOJ-sanctioned model policy, a significant minority declined to

316. WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31.
317. WIS. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MODEL POLICY DRAFT 1 (2005) [hereinafter WIS.

DOJ MODEL POLICY DRAFT].
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adopt the DOJ policies either in full or at all, but created something else of
their own choosing.
FIGURE 4:
Source of Wisconsin Police Eyewitness ID Policies
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4. Double-Blind & Sequential Procedures
Despite this apparent experimentation, in the end, most – but not all –
police departments settled on policies that incorporate much of the social
science research and the “best practices.” In particular, as summarized in
Figure 5, a large majority of agencies adopted double-blind procedures for
photo arrays and a smaller majority chose double-blind procedures for live
lineups, indicating that even many agencies that declined to adopt the DOJ
model policy in whole or in part nonetheless incorporated double-blind procedures. For photo arrays, 229 agencies, or 65.8% of the 348 agencies with
any photo array policies, mandate double-blind procedures in every case and
another 69, or 19.8%, require double-blind “when possible.” Thus, in total,
298, or 85.6%, of all agencies with photo array policies require double-blind
procedures either in every case or whenever possible. For live lineups, 174
agencies, or 58.2% of the 299 agencies with a policy on lineups, mandate
double-blind procedures in every case, and another 53 agencies, or 17.7%,
call for double-blind lineups “when possible.” Thus, combined, 227 agencies, or 75.9%, of all agencies with live lineup policies require double-blind
procedures either in every case or whenever possible.
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FIGURE 5:
Wisconsin Policies on Double-Blinding
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Figure 6 reveals that even more agencies adopted sequential than double-blind procedures. For photo arrays, 285 agencies, representing 81.9% of
the 348 agencies with photo array policies, require sequential procedures in
every case. Another 24 agencies, or 6.9%, call for sequential procedures
“when feasible.” Combined, 309 agencies, or 88.8% of agencies with photo
array policies, require sequential procedures in every case or whenever feasible. For live lineups, 241 agencies, or 80.6% of the 299 agencies with a live
lineup policy, require sequential procedures in every case, and another 10
agencies, or 3.3%, require sequential procedures when feasible. Combined,
83.9% of Wisconsin police agencies with written policies on lineup procedures require sequential procedures either in every case or when feasible.
FIGURE 6:
Wisconsin Policies on Sequential Presentation
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While the experimentalist approach in Wisconsin has led a majority of
agencies to adopt double-blind and sequential procedures, the results are not
perfect. First, a significant number of agencies still have not adopted either
double-blind or sequential procedures. Second, and more troublingly, as
shown in Figure 7, more agencies have adopted sequential procedures than
blind procedures. According to the research, however, blind procedures are
more important than the sequential procedures. Yet police appear more enamored with the sequential procedure than the double-blind procedure. Indeed, in the social science literature, sequential procedures are recommended
only if conducted in a double-blind manner. Without blinding, the sequential
procedure, which permits a witness to spend more time focused on a single
photo or individual while engaged with a detective who knows whether that
individual or photo is the suspect, is especially vulnerable to the kinds of
even unintentional cuing that the blind procedure is designed to minimize.318
Left to their own devices, some police agencies have thus inadvertently
adopted policies that include the worst possible combination – non-blind sequential procedures.
FIGURE 7:
Policies on Double-Blind and Sequential Procedures
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A deeper examination of the way Wisconsin agencies approach doubleblind procedures reveals additional agency-level experimentation and varying
degrees of concordance with best practices. Table 1 shows again that, while
most agencies have adopted double-blind protocols to one degree or another,
nearly fifteen percent do not for photo arrays, and a full quarter do not for live
318. See Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices, supra note 308,
at 9–10.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol81/iss2/6

64

Findley: Implementing the Lessons

2016]

IMPLEMENTING THE LESSONS

441

lineups. Additionally, Table 1 reveals that a majority of agencies – 58% for
live lineups and 63% for photos – instruct lineup administrators not to be in a
position in which they could influence the witness (in addition to or instead of
running the procedures in a double-blind manner). And a slightly smaller
majority – 57% for both live lineups and photo arrays – instruct lineup administrators somewhat ambiguously to “minimize suggestiveness.”
TABLE 1:
Policies on Blind Procedures

Double-blind—always
Double-blind—when possible
No mention of double-blind
Administrator should not be in position to influence the witness
Administrator must “minimize suggestiveness”

Photo Policies
(N=348)
65.8% (229)
19.8% (69)
14.4% (50)
63.2% (220)

Lineup Policies
(N=299)
65.0% (174)
17.7% (53)
24.1% (72)
58.2% (174)

56.9% (193)

57.2% (171)

When agency policies call for sequential procedures, they are even more
likely to make them mandatory than when they call for making blind procedures mandatory. Table 2 shows that 82% of all agencies require sequential
display of photos “always,” and only 7% call for sequential “when feasible.”
Only 11% make no mention of the sequential procedure.
Table 2 also shows that a minority of agencies address what happens
when a witness asks to see the sequential display a second time. Researchers
caution that a second “lap” through the sequential process should never be
offered, but leave it to the discretion of local agencies to permit the second
lap if a witness requests it, with the understanding that the second lap reduces
or eliminates the advantages of the sequential procedure because repeated
viewings permits the witness to engage in the relative judgment process.319
Among Wisconsin’s agencies, 40% permit a second lap for photo arrays, and
26% permit it for live lineups.
Finally, Table 2 also shows that some agencies, but again a minority,
provide additional research-supported guidance on how to conduct the folder
shuffle method as a way to achieve blinded testing. Research and Wisconsin’s Model Policy instruct that the suspect should not be placed in the first
position because witnesses are often reluctant to pick the first photo or person
they see.320 Additionally, the Model Policy recommends putting two blank or
empty folders at the bottom of the sequential stack so that the witness will not
know when she has viewed the last photo and therefore will not feel com319. See generally N.K. Steblay et al., Sequential Lineup Laps and Eyewitness
Accuracy, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 262 (2011).
320. WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY, supra note 31, at 9.
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pelled to pick someone too soon.321 Of Wisconsin’s agencies, 44% instruct
officers not to put the suspect in the first position for photo arrays (and relatedly, 30% offer that guidance for live lineups). Additionally, 40% of policies
call for two blank or empty folders at the end of the sequential procedure (that
recommendation has no application to live lineups).
TABLE 2:
Policies on Sequential Procedures

Sequential – always
Sequential – when feasible
Sequential not prescribed
Allow repeat showings (“laps”) if
witness requests
Suspect should never be in first
position
Blank folders should be put at the
end

Photo Policies
(N=348)
81.9% (285)
6.9% (24)
11.2% (39)
40.5% (141)

Lineup Policies
(N=299)
80.6% (241)
3.3% (10)
16.1% (48)
26.4% (79)

44% (153)

30.4% (91)

39.9% (139)

N/A

5. Constructing & Conducting the Lineup or Array
Table 3 shows that some but not all agencies provide additional guidance on essential components of constructing a lineup or photo array. A
small majority, for example, provides directions on how many fillers (known
innocents) to include. There is no social-science-based gold standard for the
optimal number of fillers to include in a procedure. The general rule is that,
up to a point, the more fillers the better. The Wisconsin Attorney General’s
Model Procedure recommends a minimum of five fillers.322 Despite the fundamental nature of this component of any identification procedure, more than
a third of Wisconsin agency policies on photo arrays (36%), and almost half
of the policies on live lineups (47%) provide no guidance on the recommended number of fillers. On the other hand, those that do specify a minimum
number of fillers almost uniformly meet or exceed the Wisconsin Attorney
General’s recommendation of at least five fillers. For photo arrays, only 3%
recommend fewer than five fillers, while for live lineups, nearly 38% recommend a minimum of fewer than five. The difference almost certainly reflects
the greater difficulty of finding appropriate fillers for live lineups than for
photo arrays.
Table 3 also shows that most agencies provide at least some guidance on
how to select fillers so as to minimize suggestiveness, although many agency
policies do not comport fully with best practices. For photo arrays, more than
321. Id.
322. Id. at 8.
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95% of agencies provide guidance on selecting fillers, and for live lineups,
80% provide such guidance. But a large majority of agencies continue to
recommend outdated means of doing so, rather than the method recommended by the Attorney General’s Office. The Attorney General’s Model Policy
explicitly recommends matching the fillers to the description of the perpetrator, rather than to the suspect, when possible.323 Only a minority of agencies
recommend the match-to-description method (23% for photo arrays and a
mere 16% for live lineups); the majority (73% for photo arrays and 64% for
lineups), continue to recommend the traditional method of matching the fillers to the suspect.
TABLE 3:
Guidance on Use of Fillers
Photo Policies
(N=348)
Minimum of 4 fillers
Minimum of 5 fillers
Minimum of 6 fillers
Minimum of 7 fillers
No prescribed number of fillers

3.2% (11)
47.4% (165)
10.1% (35)
2.9% (10)
36.5% (127)

Lineup
Policies
(N=299)
37.8% (113)
10.7% (32)
3.3% (10)
10% (3)
47.2% (141)

Fillers should match the suspect
Fillers should match description of
perpetrator provided by the witness
No guidance provided on selecting
fillers

22.7% (79)
72.7% (253)

16.4% (49)
63.5% (190)

4.6% (16)

20% (60)

An important component of the social-science-based best practices, also
reflected in the Wisconsin Attorney General’s Model Policy, is proper witness instructions.324 Table 4 shows that most, but again not all, Wisconsin
police department policies require specific witness instructions. Nearly threequarters of photo array policies include the most important instruction: that
the real perpetrator might or might not be present in the photo array or lineup.
Smaller percentages of agencies specify additional important instructions
beyond that.

323. Id. at 8–9.
324. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text; see also WIS. DOJ MODEL

POLICY, supra note 31, at 10.
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TABLE 4:
Policies on Witness Instructions

Witness should be instructed the
perpetrator might not be present
Witness should be instructed that the
administrator does not know who the
suspect is
Witness should be instructed that it as
important to clear the innocent as
identify the guilty
Witness should be instructed s/he does
not need to identify anyone
Witness should be instructed that facial
hair and clothes can change one’s
appearance

Photo
Policies
(N=348)
74.4% (259)

Lineup
Policies
(N=299)
72.6% (217)

62.1% (216)

64.5% (193)

31.9% (111)

31.4% (94)

35.6% (124)

31.1% (91)

38.2% (133)

33.1% (99)

To guard against confidence malleability, the research and the Wisconsin Attorney General’s Model Policy also strongly recommend taking verbatim confidence statements immediately after an identification, before the witness has received any feedback.325 Table 5 shows that, while a majority of
Wisconsin agencies require prompt recording of witness statements (62% for
both photo arrays and live lineups), more than one-third of the policies do
not. Moreover, even fewer agency policies – less than one-third for both
photo arrays and live lineups – explicitly require that confidence statements
be taken verbatim.
TABLE 5:
Policies on Confidence Statements

Witness confidence must be assessed
and recorded immediately
Witness’s confidence statement should
be recorded verbatim
Avoid multiple procedures with the same
witness
Include only one suspect per procedure

Photo
Policies
(N=348)
61.8% (215)

Lineup
Policies
(N=299)
62.2% (186)

31.9% (111)

28.8% (86)

63.8% (222)

63.5% (190)

39.9% (139)

29.8% (89)

325. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text; see also WIS. DOJ MODEL
POLICY DRAFT, supra note 317, at 10.
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Finally, key components of best-practices recommendations and the Attorney General’s Model Policy include directives to avoid presenting the suspect to any witness or witnesses in more than one procedure and to include
only one suspect per photo array or lineup.326 Table 6 reveals that nearly
two-thirds of the photo array and live lineup policies include this directive,
while only 40% of the policies specifically provide for only one suspect per
photo array, and only 30% the live lineup policies include that provision.
TABLE 6:
Policies on Multiple Procedures & Multiple Suspects
Photo Policies
(N=348)
Avoid multiple procedures with the
same witness
Include only one suspect per photo
array

63.8% (222)

Lineup
Policies
(N=299)
63.8% (190)

39.9% (139)

29.8% (89)

6. Policies on Showups
Wisconsin data on one-on-one showups also provide some support for
the democratic experimentalist approach – but again with caveats. The data
reveal an area of agency involvement in policy development that top-down
regulators (legislators) have largely overlooked. Few, if any, legislative directives address showups. But left to create their own identification policies,
most Wisconsin police departments did; indeed, more agencies adopted policies on showups than on live lineups. That almost certainly reflects the fact
that showups are much more relevant to most police agencies than are live
lineups. Showups are easy to conduct, and almost all police agencies have
used them historically. They require no set-up and simply entail the expediency of presenting a suspect to a witness on the scene shortly after the offense. And they can be employed even where police lack probable cause to
arrest a suspect. Live lineups, however, are difficult to arrange. They require
access to a large pool of individuals from which police can select a sufficient
number of appropriate fillers (fillers who fit the description of the perpetrator
or who match the suspect). Most agencies simply do not have access to that
many bodies. And they usually require a suspect who is in custody. Consequently, most police agencies do not do many, if any, live lineups. The comparatively lower number of live lineup policies, therefore, likely reflects the
reality that the agencies do not do live lineups (and hence have no need for a

326. See supra notes 70–101 and accompanying text; see also WIS. DOJ MODEL
POLICY DRAFT, supra note 317, at 8.
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policy), rather than a failure to comply fully with the legislative directive to
develop relevant eyewitness identification policies.
Showups also suggest significant local experimentation and creativity
because, while the Wisconsin Attorney General’s Model Policy addressed
showups, it did not include them in the list of six key recommendations. The
Attorney General’s Office, instead, addressed showups only deep in the body
of its long-form report and not at all in its short-form policy.327 Accordingly,
to the extent that agencies were borrowing from the Attorney General’s model policy, they had to dig deeper and work harder to come up with a policy.
Nonetheless, nearly 96% of agencies with any eyewitness identification policies included policies on showups.
Two reasons likely account for this. First, because virtually all law enforcement agencies use showups to one extent or another, they likely deemed
this an important issue to include in their policies. Nothing in the legislation
required them to address showups, but given that they were bound to develop
eyewitness identification policies in general, they identified showups as an
important procedure to address.
Second, in 2005, the year the legislature passed the law requiring law
enforcement policies, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided State v.
Dubose.328 Recall that in Dubose the court changed the law on showups,
holding that showup evidence is inadmissible unless police can demonstrate
exigent circumstances requiring them to use this inherently suggestive procedure.329 Constructing a photo array or live lineup typically requires time and
prolonged access to the suspect, making an arrest a precondition in most cases. By contrast, showups can be conducted without probable cause because
police can legally detain a suspect long enough to present the suspect to the
witness at the scene based upon mere reasonable suspicion.330 According to
the Dubose court, showup evidence is ordinarily inadmissible unless police
lacked probable cause to arrest; if police had probable cause, then a showup
was not necessary (hence, there were no exigent circumstances).331 Police
could have, and should have, arrested the suspect and taken the time to construct a proper photo array or live lineup.332
While this latter rationale might help explain why showups are deemed
an important topic for inclusion in police policies, it also raises an anomaly.
If, indeed, the limitations imposed on police by Dubose were the animating
factor, then one would expect police to adopt policies on showups that comport with the demands of Dubose. But to a surprising degree, they do not. Of
the 334 responding agencies with written policies on showups, 258 (77.2%)
specified, as demanded by Dubose, that showups should only be used in “ex327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.

See WIS. DOJ MODEL POLICY DRAFT, supra note 317, at 17, 23–26.
699 N.W.2d 582, 582 (Wis. 2005).
Id. at 593.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33 (1968).
Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 594.
Id.
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igent circumstances” – but that means that nearly a quarter of the agencies
that adopted a showup policy failed to adopt a policy that comports with this
clear legal requirement. Moreover, only 60 agencies (18% of agencies with a
showup policy) defined exigent circumstances in this context as circumstances in which police lacked probable cause to arrest, as the Wisconsin Supreme
Court held in Dubose. As depicted in Figure 8, agencies adopted a variety of
constraints on their use of showups, which comport with Dubose to varying
degrees. The failure to achieve higher levels of compliance with Dubose,
even on paper let alone in practice, suggests at least some limits to the effectiveness of command-and-control reform strategies reflected by the Dubose
mandate. This is not, of course, to argue that mandates such as Dubose are of
no value, but rather to point out that full effectiveness will depend upon strategies that inform and enforce once the mandate is in place.
FIGURE 8:
Wisconsin Police Policies on Showups
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In sum, the Wisconsin data show that the bottom-up experimentalist approach has produced real advancements in local policies, but has permitted
significant minorities – and on some issues even significant majorities – to
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continue utilizing outdated and problematic procedures. Wisconsin police, on
paper at least, are far ahead of the national norms for eyewitness identification policies, but there remains plenty of room for continued reform.

C. The Virginia Comparison
Fuller insights into the experimentalist approach can be gleaned from a
comparison of Wisconsin’s experience to that in Virginia, as analyzed by
Brandon Garrett.333 Virginia’s short statutory directive – requiring police to
adopt written eyewitness identification policies – arose in a police culture in
which there had been scant previous attention paid to identification procedures. Prior to enactment of its eyewitness identification statute, from 19932005, the Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services (“DCJS”) had
just a short, “barebones” model policy – just a few lines long – that “offered
no instructions and almost no guidance at all on how to conduct . . . different
types of [identification] procedures.”334 Following enactment of Virginia’s
statute in 2005, requiring every agency to adopt eyewitness identification
policies, the DCJS revised and updated its recommended model policy.335
The revised policy added for the first time an introduction to concepts such as
the use of blind and sequential identification procedures and the description
of detailed, clear instructions to be provided to eyewitnesses, including an
instruction that the suspect “may or may not be present.”336 But the 2005
model policy provided no instructions on how to use the folder system, which
many smaller jurisdictions elsewhere have found essential to their ability to
blind their processes.337 And most problematically, the 2005 model policy
made the same mistake that some Wisconsin police agencies have made of
making sequential procedures mandatory, but blind procedures only optional.338
In 2010, the DCJS surveyed law enforcement in Virginia and found that,
despite the legislative directive to adopt written polices, at least 25% of the
agencies that responded still had no policy at all.339 Of the agency policies
reviewed in that survey, 66% adopted the sequential method, but only 6%
required blind procedures.340 As noted above, police apparently unwittingly
adopted the worst-case combination of recommended reforms. A follow-up

333. Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices, supra note 308, at

5–6.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
Id.
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survey of 267 law enforcement agencies found that most Virginia police departments still had not adopted best practices.341
In November 2011, the DCJS again revised its model policies, this time
issuing a comprehensive set of recommendations fully based on the social
science research.342 The model policy recommends a number of best practices, including the “Folder Shuffle Method” that “was devised to address concerns surrounding limited personnel resources while allowing for blind administration.”343 The model policy also recommends double-blind administration and sequential viewing for both photo and live Lineup Procedures.344
The model is purely advisory.345 Despite this new, comprehensive, and welldrafted policy, reform has still been slow to come.346 Nearly two years after
the model policy was adopted, Garrett found that even then, “the vast majority of agencies across Virginia have failed to implement the best practices.”347
A comparison of Virginia’s agency policies to Wisconsin’s agency policies on some of the key variables is presented in Figure 9. Garrett requested
the written policies from the 300-plus police agencies in the state.348 Of
those, 201 responded and 145 provided written policies; one-fifth of the
agencies still lacked any policy at all, in violation of the Virginia statute.349
Of the 144 reviewed policies, only 6% had implemented the 2011 model policy; only 40% required blind lineup procedures or even made them optional;
only 9 agencies described the folder shuffle method as an option; 43 out of
144 had no provisions regarding the need to minimize suggestion; only 88 of
144 included standard witness instructions; and most (84/144) had no policies

341. Id. at 13.
342. VA. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., MODEL POLICY ON EYEWITNESS

IDENTIFICATION (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/cple/sampleDirectives/
manual/2-39.pdf. This model policy was developed with the help of University of
Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett and has since been revised twice in July 2012
and September 2013. Id.
343. Id. at 5.
344. Id. The policy notes that even if blind administration is not feasible,
a ‘blinded’ administrator may be used, namely an individual who knows the
suspect’s identity but is not in a position to see which members of the line-up
are being viewed by the eyewitness. This can be accomplished, for instance,
through the use of the folder shuffle method or via laptop technology.

Id. at 6–7.
345. Id. at 1–2.
346. Va. Law Enforcement Agencies Fail to Improve Eyewitness ID Policies, UVA
Law Professor Finds, U. VA. SCH. L. (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.law.virginia.edu/
html/news/2013_fall/garrett_eyewitness_study.htm.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
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at all on showups.350 Problematically, far more policies required sequential
than blind procedures; 63% required or suggested sequential procedures, but
only 40% required or suggested blind procedures.351
FIGURE 9:
Wisconsin and Virginia Photo Identification Policies
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While the data cannot be used to draw firm conclusions about causation,
the Virginia story suggests some possible explanations for the underperformance of Virginia police compared to Wisconsin police. The experience
suggests that simply directing police to do something is not enough. The
Virginia law did little to guide law enforcement about what was expected of
them, the reasons they should adopt policies, or even the existence of model
policies and the body of social science research. When the state finally updated its model policies, they were inadequate and confused. Little was done
to create a culture of shared participation and responsibility.

350. Id.; Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices, supra note 308,
at 6–20.
351. Garrett, Eyewitness Identifications and Police Practices, supra note 308, at
15, 17. Subsequent to Brandon Garrett’s survey of Virginia police, the Virginia Association of Chiefs of Police (“VACP”) in the spring of 2014 conducted another survey of the 135 Virginia police agencies with “primary law enforcement responsibilities” (those that investigate crimes). E-mail from Rebecca Brown, Innocence Project
Policy Dir., to author (July 21, 2015) (on file with author). According to the VACP,
their data showed substantially improved compliance with best practices, although
they have not released the actual policies yet for outside assessment. Id.
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Together, given the much higher rates of policy engagement in Wisconsin and Virginia compared to national norms, and the sure but incomplete
movement toward best practices, the Wisconsin and Virginia experiences
suggest that the Democratic Experimentalist model has real potential to work
from the bottom up to improve law enforcement practices. But those experiences also reinforce the notion that real experimentalist reform requires not
only the freedom for local experimentation and an obligation to address a
problem, but also systems for benchmarking “best practices,” setting standards, measuring outcomes, sharing learning, and ensuring accountability. In
the end, Kate Kruse was likely correct when she observed that “if the experimentalist potential of the Wisconsin reforms is to come to fruition, administrative agencies--specifically the Wisconsin Department of Justice--will need
to take a more active role in creating structures of information coordination.”352

CONCLUSION
Translating learning about wrongful convictions into reform of the criminal justice system has proven to be a challenge. Even with eyewitness identification evidence – on which there is near-unanimous agreement about what
needs to be done to improve police practices – reform has been slow and uneven. The diffusion of the criminal justice system across fifty states and
18,000 independent law enforcement agencies poses particular challenges and
demands locally tailored responses. The states have experimented with alternative methods of effecting reform, from top-down, command-and-control
legislation or judicial mandates, to hands-off education and persuasion approaches, to a middle path involving systems for imposing reform obligations
on police, without dictating the nature of the reforms, in a manner that loosely
fits within “new government” and “democratic experimentalism” models of
agency regulation.
While the results have been mixed, it does appear that the democratic
experimentalist model has real potential for engaging police constructively in
solving the problem of eyewitness error. The data also suggest, however, that
careful attention must be paid to essential components of a new governance
model and, in particular, the necessity for appropriate benchmarking, accountability, and feedback. To date, no existing legislation has fully addressed those essential components, and the reforms have suffered as a consequence. None of this is to say that the experimentalist model is necessarily
superior to the command-and-control model, as that conclusion requires additional research examining actual police practices on the streets. But it does at
least suggest that, done properly and in the right circumstances, the new governance approach can be part of the solution to the problem of eyewitness
misidentification.

352. Kruse, supra note 24, at 650.
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